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Organizational Responsiveness to Anti-offshoring
Institutional Pressures

ABSTRACT
This study explores the extent to which organizations are responsive to pressures from
institutional constituents against offshoring of information technology and business processes.
Drawing on a theoretical framework that integrates institutional and strategic explanations, it
proposes that organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures is a function
of both the characteristics of such pressures as well as organizations’ prior success with
offshoring. Results based on moderated hierarchical multiple regression analyses on survey data
from 84 offshoring client organizations indicate the following.
First, both greater organizational expectations of enhanced social legitimacy obtained from
compliance and mimetic influences from other organizations led to greater organizational
responsiveness. Second, despite the strong precedent, organizational dependence on a key
pressuring constituent had no effect. Third, both conflict of institutional expectations with
organizational goals and greater regulatory environment uncertainty reduced responsiveness.
Fourth, surprisingly, organizational success with offshoring had no direct effect on
responsiveness. However, it attenuated the otherwise strong positive effect of social legitimacy
and exacerbated the negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty. Implications of these
findings for research and practice are discussed.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Offshoring1 of Information Technology (IT) and Business Processes (BP) has grown
dramatically during the past decade and is expected to continue growing (e.g., Willcocks, Cullen,
and Craig, 2010). For example, in the year 2010, IT offshoring alone was estimated to be a $70
to $80 billion market with a capacity to grow to about half of the currently $800 billion IT
outsourcing market (Iyengar, 2011a). Parallel to this explosive growth, negative sentiments
surrounding offshoring have evolved within the realms of public opinion and concerns of
professionals from relative quiescence to a much broader back-lash and political uproar against
offshoring (e.g., Mankiw and Swagel, 2006; Rottman and Lacity, 2004). A September 2010,
legislative attempt in the United States (U.S.) Senate titled “S.3816 - Creating American Jobs
and Ending Offshoring Act” illustrates2 the extent to which such broader anti-offshoring
institutional pressures3 have become pervasive.

1.1 Statement of Research Issue
Despite the anti-offshoring institutional pressures, it is difficult to imagine that offshoring
as a sourcing strategy will disappear. The current levels of offshoring and future growth
projections seem to suggest otherwise. For example, industry predictions from organizations
such as Gartner, IDC, Everest, and NASSCOM suggest an annual IT offshoring growth rate of
1

For the purposes of this study, we define offshoring broadly. It refers to the process of sourcing business functions
supporting domestic or global operations from abroad, in particular from lower-cost emerging economies, either
through a wholly owned subsidiary (captive offshoring), a third-party provider (offshore outsourcing), or a hybrid
arrangement [e.g., Manning, Massini, and Lewin, 2008].
2
This bill failed to become law. Section 2 provides an in-depth examination of anti-offshoring institutional pressures
within the United States
3
The phrase ‘anti-offshoring institutional pressures’ is used here broadly to denote expectations or demands from
institutional constituents that organizations should reduce or eliminate offshoring. The institutional constituents
include, but are not limited to, the general public and public opinion, governments, regulatory structures, laws,
professions, and interest groups. This view of institutional constituents and pressures is consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
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12% or higher during the years 2010-2015 (Lacity, Khan, Yan, and Willcocks, 2010). Gartner
Research found that in light of increased cost pressures due to the recession, many organizations
reported renegotiating existing domestic outsourcing contracts for a lower dollar amount in
exchange for lower levels of service and/or more offshore delivery (Iyengar, 2011a; Tramacere,
2011). From this perspective, the extent to which organizations engage in offshoring seems to be
more a function of economic imperatives and organizations’ strategic considerations than of antioffshoring institutional pressures.
On the other hand, it is unreasonable to assume that organizations will outright resist such
pressures. Smith and McKeen (2004) reported that executives are cognizant of the “optics of
offshoring” and consider such issues in making offshoring decisions. Research firm Technology
Partners International, suggests that during 2011, “U.S. and Canadian companies exhibited
growing preferences to keep outsourced work within their countries, often because of sensitivity
about data security or offshoring in general” (Reynolds, 2011). A ‘CIO Magazine’ article
(Overby, 2010) suggested that IS executives can prepare for potential anti-offshoring legislation
(a significant manifestation of anti-offshoring pressures) by dealing with suppliers which have a
larger U.S. presence and/or by incorporating contractual provisions to buffer against significant
anti-offshoring legislation (Overby, 2010). An indirect indicator of such responses from
organizations is the ramping up of onshore delivery capabilities by offshore service providers
(Iyengar, 2011b).
In summary, it is difficult to imagine organizations as invariably conforming or resistant
to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. That is, the extent to which organizations are
responsive to institutional pressures for the elimination (or at least reduction) of offshoring
remains an empirical question. Indeed, organizational responses related to offshoring may not be
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dichotomous in this regard: They are likely to fall on a continuum ranging from conformity to
resistance. But what explains the extent to which organizations are responsive to such pressures?

1.2 Gaps in the Broader Literature
The current offshoring literature predominantly points to the economic and strategic
drivers of offshoring. While labor costs savings remain the primary economic driver of
offshoring (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan and Fitzgerald, 2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008;
Rao, Poole, Raven, and Lockwood, 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995), a variety of strategic
considerations have evolved. These range from access to qualified personnel, faster delivery
speeds, business or process performance improvements, access to new markets (e.g., Carmel and
Tjia, 2005; Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995), and the conduct of
core activities such as innovation (Lewin, Massini, and Peeters, 2009; Willcocks et al., 2010).
There is ample indication in the literature that firms do accrue the strategic benefits which
initially led them to consider offshoring (e.g., Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Lewin and Peeters,
2006b; Tate et al., 2009). The literature also suggests that there is substantial variation in terms
of the extent of benefits derived by client firms (e.g., King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Lacity and
Rottman, 2008).
While the strategic aspects of offshoring are well studied, unfortunately, the current
offshoring literature is silent on the impact of anti-offshoring institutional pressures. Further little
is empirically known about the prominence of organizational strategic considerations vis-à-vis
institutional considerations. Given its critical relevance for clients, suppliers, and public policy in
terms of both client and supplier countries, scholars have called for a more systematic
examination of such broader institutional pressures against offshoring and their impact on the
future of sourcing (Lacity et al., 2010 pp. 414-415).
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1.3 Research Purpose and Questions
Thus, the purpose of this research is to develop and test a theory based model that relates
both the characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures and organizations’ strategic
considerations with organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. We
develop a conceptual model based on Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework and test its
predictions using data from a survey of 84 offshoring client organizations. The context of this
study is information technology and business process offshoring.
Specifically, the model draws on Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework to suggest the
following. 1) Characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures will predict organizational
responsiveness to such pressures. 2) The greater the organizations’ success with offshoring the
lower the organizational responsiveness. 3) Interactions between organizations’ success with
offshoring and characteristics of anti-offshoring institutional pressures will also predict
organizational responsiveness.
Thus, this research addresses the following broad questions in the context of offshoring.
1) How responsive are organizations to anti-offshoring pressures?
2) Do characteristics of anti-offshoring pressures determine organizational responsiveness?
3) Does organizational success with offshoring determine organizational responsiveness?
4) Does success with offshoring interact with characteristics of anti-offshoring pressures to
determine organizational responsiveness?
In terms of delimiting the purpose of this research (Creswell, 2009) it 1) does not take a
pro- or anti-offshoring stance 2) is not concerned with the potential consequences of
organizational conformity or resistance to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, and 3) is not an
attempt to assess the “true” macro-economic and societal impacts of offshoring.
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The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine antioffshoring institutional pressures in detail. In section 3, we review literature on the drivers and
outcomes of offshoring with a particular focus on institutional theory based explanations of
outsourcing decisions. Next, we describe the theoretical framework which forms the basis for
this study in section 4. In section 5, equipped with the literature review, theoretical framework,
and a better understanding of the nature of anti-offshoring institutional pressures, we develop a
set of hypotheses. In section 6, we then describe the research methodology. Following this, we
discuss the research findings (section 7), describe the implications for research (section 8) and
practice (section 9), and list the limitation and suggestions for future research (section 10) prior
to concluding.

2

ANTI-OFFSHORING INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES

Anti-offshoring institutional pressures are part of a broader backlash against global labor
arbitrage. Just as earlier attempts of manufacturing firms to move production to destinations with
lower overall costs of doing business, the phenomena of IT and BP offshoring began to gather
negative sentiments (Gupta, Seshasai, Mukherji, and Ganguly, 2007). These anti-offshoring
pressures are evident across a broad spectrum of institutional constituents, such as the political
spheres, state and federal level legislative attempts to curb offshoring, public opinion,
professionals, and special interest groups such as labor unions, among others. The logic held
behind anti-offshoring pressures is simple: offshoring hurts labor market and firms should curb
offshoring so as to prevent domestic jobs from being sent offshore (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006).
The political backlash against offshoring became vociferous when high profile politicians
joined the fray (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). For example, in the United States, 2004 presidential
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candidate Senator John Kerry made a series of comments such as “We will repeal every single
benefit, every single loophole, every single reward for any Benedict Arnold CEO or corporation
that take [sic] American jobs overseas.4” This was happening at the backdrop of growing
negative public opinion about offshoring. In November of 2003 a public outcry was cited as the
reason, the Governor of the state of Indiana cancelled a $15.2 million contract previously
awarded to an Indian IT supplier, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)5. A 2004 UBS/Gallup
opinion poll of investors revealed that “[M]ost investors not only oppose outsourcing6, but also
support strong actions to limit its use by corporate America. (Jacobe, 2004a, emphasis added).”
Broader public opinion polls showed a similar backlash and an anti-offshoring stance. A
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll revealed that 60% of Americans considered a negative impact of
offshoring on U.S. jobs to be an important issue that is likely to affect their vote in the coming
2004 presidential election (Jacobe, 2004b). Parallel to this, media commentators such as Lou
Dobbs, formerly at CNN, made a virtue out of condemning offshoring. In a rather interesting
exposition, Lacity and Rudramuniyaiah (2009) analyzed the public opinion with respect to
outsourcing and offshoring as reflected in U.S. and Indian political cartoons. Based on content
analyses of 165 cartoons from U.S. and India, the authors found that U.S./Western cartoons
typically portrayed outsourcing and offshoring negatively. Common themes were job loss for
workers and poorer customer service for consumers. The Indian cartoons, on the other hand,
typically depicted jobs gained as well as the labor and infrastructure constrains caused by the
rapid growth of IT and BP offshoring (Lacity and Rudramuniyaiah, 2009).

(Reported in Washington Times editorial as John Kerry’s statement following a win in the southern primaries in
Virginia and Tennessee; Washington Times Editorial, May 30, 2004; Similar statements reported in The Wall Street
Journal, February 12, 2004)
5
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/87537/State_agency_cancels_controversial_outsourcing_deal (Retrieved
on 04/01/2011)
6
The term “outsourcing” is often used in the popular press and common parlance to denote “offshoring”
4
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Professional associations such as the Programmers Guild maintain offshoring and workvisas (e.g., H1-b and L-1 visas that allow foreign nationals to temporarily work in the United
States) as key issues. They continue to call for action against offshoring and for elimination of
work visa programs.7 Calls for action include, contacting legislature, rebutting “pro-offshoring
studies”, and protests/demonstrations against large corporations which offshore. Powerful union
groups such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) and the Communication Workers of America – Local 4250 have also long been
vocal and active against offshoring and work visas8. Further, research has shown that
professionals in the United States are wary of offshoring. For example, IT professionals perceive
it as a threat to their job security, believe that it has a negative impact on their work and family
life, and are predominantly in favor of union based and legislative protectionist measures against
IT offshoring (Bruce and Martz, 2007; Knapp, Sharma, and King, 2007). Even senior IS
scholars have acknowledged that the negative perceptions of all IT jobs being offshored have
caused a serious decline in enrollments within IS and Computer Science programs across U.S.
universities (e.g., Hirschheim, Loebbecke, Newman, and Valor, 2007; Hirschheim and Newman,
2010; Kaarst-brown, 2010). While some consider this to be primarily a problem of incorrect
perceptions (Hirschheim and Newman, 2010), others have acknowledged that offshoring is the
new reality (Beulen, 2010). Yet others argue that offshoring has an overall positive impact on
national economy but recognize the significant negative sentiments toward it (Gupta, 2010).

7

Programmers Guild, available online at: http://www.programmersguild.org/offshoring.asp (Retrieved on March 25,
2011).
8
AFL-CIO, available online at: http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec03112004i.cfm and
http://act.aflcio.org/c/18/p/dia/action/public/index.sjs?action_KEY=760 (Retrieved on March 25, 2011).
Communication Workers of America – Local 4250, available online at: http://www.cwalocal4250.org/outsourcing/
(Retrieved on March 25, 2011)
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The anti-offshoring public sentiments and political rhetoric have also transformed into antioffshoring legislative attempts (Shao and David, 2007). Lawmakers at the state and federal levels
have proposed bills which either directly target offshoring or have an indirect impact on it. In
terms of legislative attempts at directly restricting offshoring, bills barring government
contractors from performing work outside the respective state or United States have emerged.
Other bills include: preference systems for contract awards at the state level; mandatory
disclosure of geographical location in calls to and from offshore call centers; ban on transmission
of personal or financial information of customers abroad without complying with a set of
conditions; mandatory disclosure about activities relating to offshoring, such as lay-offs and
outsourcing production; and economic sanctions such as elimination of state assistance to
businesses that have laid off American employees and shifted jobs to a foreign country (Canto
and van Gorp, 2007; Gupta and Sao, 2009; Manley and Hobby, 2006; Mordecai, 2005). Other
legislative attempts are indirect but perhaps more potent. These include bills surrounding data
privacy, labor negotiations, protection of intellectual property, bureaucratic preconditions on
offshore contracts, and visa policies aimed at either restricting the number of foreign workers or
increasing the costs of obtaining work visas (Canto and van Gorp, 2007; Gupta and Sao, 2009).
Notable among such legislative attempts was the 2005-2006 proposal at the Federal level, by the
then Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, termed the “Safeguarding Americans from Exporting
Identification Data Act' or `SAFE-ID Act'.” The proposed law sought to bar the transmission of
any personally identifiable information of a U.S. citizen to any entity in a foreign country unless
a set of standards was first met, including allowing consumers to prevent the transmission of
such information.

Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 9

The National Foundation of American Policy claims that between 2003 and 2007 alone
upwards of 400 bills attempted to curb offshoring in one way or another of which only 12
became law9. For example, year 2004 legislation in Tennessee (Tennessee House Bill 2344)
gives preference to data entry and call center operations vendors who ensure that the services are
provided by U.S. citizens10. Another example is the 2005 legislation in New Jersey (New Jersey
Senate Bill 494) which prohibits state contract work from being performed offshore10.
The latest wave of anti-offshoring institutional pressures seems to coincide with the global
economic crisis which began around 2008 and appears to be stronger than before. In 2008, the
then presidential candidate Barack Obama stated while campaigning “I will stop giving tax
breaks to companies that ship jobs overseas, and I will start giving them to companies that
create good jobs right here in America.11” In September 2010, with the unemployment rate in
the United States hovering around 10% and the 111th Congressional Session nearing its end,
democrats lead by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced just such a bill titled, “S.3816 Creating American Jobs and Ending Offshoring Act.” The proposed bill sought to amend the tax
code in order to create American jobs and prevent the offshoring of such jobs. While the bill
failed to become law, President Obama, officially criticized the opponents of this bill in White
House press statements. In the weekly presidential address dated September 25, 2010 the
president stated that “when we recently closed one of the most egregious loopholes for

9

National Foundation for American Policy available online at http://www.nfap.com/pdf/0407OutsourcingBrief.pdf
(Retrieved, March 25, 2011). Foundation website: http://www.nfap.com
10
State of Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research, Report # 2004-R-0647, September 14,
2004 and 2004-R-0241, March 9, 2004. Available online at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0647.htm and
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0241.htm (retrieved on June 18, 2011). See,
http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/sitesearch.asp by searching for “outsourcing” for additional state level regulatory
restrictions
11
CIO Magazine: September 2, 2008, Patrick Thibodeau. Available online at:
http://www.cio.com/article/447091/Obama_Speaks_Out_Against_Offshore_Outsourcing (Retrieved March 25,
2011).
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companies creating jobs overseas, Republicans in Congress were almost unanimously opposed.
The Republican leader John Boehner attacked us for it, and stood up for outsourcing, instead of
American workers.12” The President also cited an overwhelming public opinion against
outsourcing as evident from the “America Speaking Out” initiative by the Republican Party.
Among other things, the initiative involved inviting citizens to suggest ideas for job creation on
the “America Speaking Out” website13. Indeed, a post against “outsourcing of jobs from
America” received the most interest and close to 5000 “thumbs up” votes.
A border security bill was passed in July 2010 that had a provision for a steep increase in the
visa fees for H1-b and L-1 visas. These increases in visa fees were estimated to add about $250
million to the annual visa fee expenditures for the Indian IT industry14. In the same month, the
state of Ohio banned offshore work for government contracts. In the back drop of such changes,
and the proposed introduction of the bill S.3816, the Indian offshoring industry began to show its
concern. In September 2010, a high profile delegation led by the Indian industry group, National
Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) and comprising senior
representatives from Indian firms such as Wipro, Infosys, and TCS, visited Washington to voice
its concern with law makers. Mr. Ameet Nivsarkar, NASSCOM Vice-President summarized the
purpose of this visit: “It is a focused delegation. The idea is to make sure that we communicate

12

White House Weekly Address: September 25, 2010. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/09/25/weekly-address-president-obama-gop-leadership-standing-outsourcing-and-s (Retrieved March
25, 2011).
13
America Speaking Out Website: http://www.americaspeakingout.com/browse/questions/in/job-creation (Retrieved
March 25, 2011)
14
The Hindu – Business Line, September 14, 2010. Available online at:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2010/09/15/stories/2010091552280700.htm (Retrieved, March 25, 2011).
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our disappointment on the anti-outsourcing rhetoric, and also ensure that it does not become a
trend in the US.15 ”
In summary, regardless of the debate over whether such anti-offshoring institutional
pressures are appropriate, necessary, or effective (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006), the above
synopsis indicates that these pressures do exist. Thus, it is important to assess how characteristics
of anti-offshoring pressures affect the strategic offshoring responses of offshoring client
organizations. We review literature on offshoring next.

3

LITERATURE REVIEW

As mentioned in section 1, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of both
institutional and strategic considerations on the extent of organizational responsiveness to antioffshoring institutional pressures in the context of their IT and BP offshoring initiatives. Thus, it
seems pertinent to understand the strategic drivers of offshoring, the benefits organizations
derive from offshoring, and the challenges and risks faced in doing so. Similarly, it is important
to assess the extent to which institutional explanations account for outsourcing related decisions
and the extent to which strategic considerations and institutional aspects act in conjunction with
each other. In the following sub-sections, we review the offshoring literature across these areas
and conclude the literature review with a broad summary.

3.1 Strategic Drivers of Offshoring
Researchers have investigated a variety of factors that may predict and/or explain
organizations’ offshoring decisions. Factors related to the internal motives of client firms and the
The Hindu – Business Line, September 14, 2010. Available online at:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2010/09/15/stories/2010091552280700.htm (Retrieved, March 25, 2011).
15
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nature of the transactions have been reported to play a role in the decision to offshore (Lacity et
al., 2010; Lacity, Solomon, Yan, and Willcocks, 2011).
In terms of the motivations to offshore, cost reduction is by far the most dominant driver
reported in the literature (Lacity, Khan, and Willcocks, 2009). Both earlier studies (e.g., Clark,
Jr., Zmud and McCray 1995; Lacity, Hirschheim and Willcocks 1994) and more recent ones
(e.g., Fisher, Hirschheim and Jacobs 2008; Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis 2005a; Lin, Lin and
Huang 2007) have repeatedly shown that a client organization’s desire or need to reduce costs
was a key driver for domestic outsourcing decisions (Blaskovich and Mintchik, 2011; Lacity et
al., 2010). Similarly, cost reduction has been widely cited as the primary reason organizations are
attracted to lower cost offshore destinations (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan and Fitzgerald,
2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Rao, Poole, Raven, and Lockwood, 2006; Sobol and Apte,
1995).
Other drivers for sourcing IT and BP related services through an offshore model include,
access to expertise/skills of global suppliers, business or process performance improvements,
enhancing service levels, warding off competitive pressures, improving flexibility and scalability,
achieving faster delivery of IT and BP related services, and access to new markets in offshore
destinations (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Currie, Michell, and Abanishe, 2008; Hutzschenreuter,
Lewin, and Dresel, 2011; Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995).
Organizational motives to achieve scalable operations and improve time-for-delivery of services
have been particularly more prominent in studies focusing on BP related decisions (Lacity et al.,
2011).
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In terms of attributes of the transactions, some have observed that potential increases in
the transaction costs related to finding, evaluating, and managing offshore suppliers may
discourage firms from offshoring (Smith and McKeen, 2004). Indeed, many studies report such
increases in production and transaction costs as outcomes of offshoring (King and Torkzadeh,
2008; Lacity and Rottman, 2008). Similarly, a potential increase in business risks (Smith and
McKeen, 2004), concern for data security and protecting intellectual property (Gokhale, 2007;
Sobol and Apte, 1995), and a relatively high degree of interdependence among tasks (Mirani,
2007), have been reported to be negatively related to the decision to offshore.
Further, based on insights from a focus group of senior IT managers representing a
variety of companies across broad industry types, Smith and McKeen (2004) indicate that senior
IT managers are typically cognizant of several risk factors associated with offshoring and often
take these into account in making IT offshoring decisions. The senior IT managers in their focus
group alluded to higher than expected transaction costs, reduced control on the delivery of IT
services, legal and political uncertainties with respect to offshore destinations, cultural
differences, and social justice issues. Smith and McKeen’s (2004) finding of ‘social justice’
related issues need particular elaboration given the study purposes. The authors mention that
their focus group members “were very aware of the ‘optics’ of offshore outsourcing.” For
example, one member stated that “public perceptions are important to us.”

3.2 Success with Offshoring
Having looked at the literature on offshoring decisions, it is important to also consider the
literature which examines whether such organizations achieve the desired benefits (e.g. cost
savings) from offshoring initiatives. Majority of empirical research on this issue focuses on
explaining variation in the outcomes of offshoring as a function of a variety of factors. However,
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relatively few studies directly describe the extent to which firms achieve the desired benefits.
Nevertheless, a few sources do provide a clear indication of the organizational benefits of
offshoring. These studies suggest that firms often accrue important cost and non-cost benefits
from offshoring. Further, this literature suggests that offshoring has evolved beyond the
traditional labor arbitrage paradigm and now includes strategic aspects such as innovation and
global access to qualified talent (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009).
The “Offshoring Research Network” (ORN) at Duke University’s Fuqua School of
Business conducts a multi-year survey of a sample of firms regarding their outsourcing and
offshoring initiatives. The survey covers of a variety of business processes including IT and
software development. The 2004 survey was targeted to a sample of 650 U.S. Forbes 2000
companies. Findings based on responses from 90 companies indicate that firms’ expectations
from offshoring were either met or exceeded (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a). The reported median
range of achieved cost savings across various types of offshore implementations were between
30-40%. In addition, about 15% of offshore implementations led to cost savings of 50% or more.
Similarly, in terms of operational service levels Lewin and Peeters (2006a p. 232) reported that
74% of offshore implementations met service level expectations within the first 12 months of
implementation. Overall, the authors suggested that strong positive performances were
legitimizing the practice of offshoring across a wide variety of business processes, including IT,
and predicted that the trend is expected to continue.
Findings from the 2007-2008 Offshoring Research Survey pertaining to the outcomes of
offshoring indicate that firms in general report a variety of benefits which go beyond costsavings. Further, the extent of benefits reported was generally higher for those firms which had a
corporate-wide offshoring strategy than those which did not. For example, across the types of
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functions offshored, 44% of the firms without a corporate offshoring strategy reported as having
achieved ‘improved organizational flexibility’ where as 75% of the firms which had a corporate
wide strategy reported achieving the same benefit. Other benefits at the company-level include
increased productivity/efficiency, increase in firm’s overall competitiveness, better access to
qualified personnel, better focus on core competencies, improved service quality, firm growth,
and process improvements (Lewin, 2008). Further, and in contrast to reports from the 2004
survey, the 2007-2008 survey reveals that firms achieved lower than expected cost savings but
those with existing offshoring strategies fared better in this regard. For example, in terms of IT
offshoring, firms without a functional offshoring strategy expected to the tune of 55% (median
values) of savings but reported achieving about 30%. However, those firms with an overall
offshoring strategy expected 40% and achieved 35%. Overall, firms obtained higher savings after
having implemented corporate-wide offshoring strategies (Lewin, 2008).
Tate, Ellram, Bals and Hartmann (2009) used a multi-theoretical lens to study the
evolution of offshoring through a multiple-case study of 9 large Western organizations. In-depth
interviews and archival data analyses indicated that in line with the primary motivation of costreduction, firms did accrue cost related benefits. The study also indicates that as firms progressed
in their offshore endeavors they also realized substantial non-cost benefits and began to
anticipate such benefits in the future. Those firms which engaged in IT offshoring reported such
varied benefits as gaining a foothold in a new geography, increased quality in products and
services, access to educated employees, scalability improvements, flexibility, organizational
learning, and improvements in business processes. Among these, access to qualified talent,
quality, and process improvements were the most cited. For example, one respondent from an
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Automotive company offshoring IT services “stated that its offshore provider is better at quality
management and documentation than available onshore providers (Tate et al., 2009 pp. 517).”
Based on a four-phase Delphi study comprising of 10 senior professionals with
considerable experience in offshoring, Gokhale (2007) reports that executives believe that
overall benefits from offshoring include cost savings, improvements in “time-to-market”,
scalability in terms of labor, round the clock development work, and access to new technologies,
tools, and techniques which an organization may not currently possess (Gokhale, 2007). The
executives also demonstrated consensus in that it is essential to have quantifiable added value
metrics to ultimately define success with an offshoring initiative (Gokhale, 2007).
Bhalla, Sodhi, and Son (2008) attempted to assess if there is any link between the extent
of offshoring and the performance (sales, profit as a percentage of sales, average annual sales per
employee, and average annual profit per employee) of 144 of the Global Fortune 500 list of
companies during the 5 year period from 1999 to 2004. Based on archival data from public
announcements related to offshoring activities of the sample firms, the authors conclude that they
could not find any direct or clear evidence between the extent of offshoring and firm
performance. Their regression analyses did indicate that IT offshoring was positively related to
average annual sales. The authors do not view their results as definitive indication of a lack of
benefits from offshoring and suggest that future research may incorporate better measures of
performance such as metrics at the business unit or department level (Bhalla et al., 2008).
Indeed, it is quite possible that the performance indicators chosen in this study may be too distal
from the benefits of offshoring.
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Rottman and Lacity (2008) conducted 45 interviews and analyses of a large volume of
documents at a major bio-tech firm in the United States which offshored 21 IT projects to six
suppliers in India. The authors observe that juxtaposed against the promised benefits of offshore
outsourcing such as lower IT costs, faster delivery speeds, and ability to focus on core
capabilities, IT managers often struggle to realize full potential of offshoring. Rottman and
Lacity (2008) found that while documents and reports by the senior management suggested that
projects were consistently successful in delivering substantial cost savings, those intricately
involved with the projects rated them poorly in terms of cost, quality, and productivity. For
example, the head of the project management office observed that while the organization may
have saved money on hourly labor costs, if other factors such as the extra effort in managing
these projects and delayed delivery are taken into account, the organization may have actually
lost money. The authors concluded that the firm’s strategy to replace domestic contractors with
cheaper offshore suppliers was a poor fit with the firm’s social and cultural contexts and that the
firm’s project management processes were incompatible with those of the offshore suppliers.
Similar sentiments are echoed elsewhere. For example, in summarizing the findings of
the studies submitted to the 2008 MIS Quarterly special issue on Information Systems
Offshoring, King and Torkzadeh (2008) report that some studies found that rather than reducing
costs, offshoring leads to increases in production and transaction costs. Also, while some studies
reported a favorable stock market reaction to offshoring in general, others provide evidence
suggesting that financial markets favor domestic outsourcing over offshoring when a firm’s
motive is to improve process quality (King and Torkzadeh, 2008).
Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl’s (2008) study posed the question why is there so much
variation in economic success between off-shored projects if the wage-differential, cited as the
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primary offshoring motivation, is in fact so high. In particular they explored what types of “extra
costs” do clients incur in offshore projects; and how/why do these extra costs for clients vary
between projects. Defining client extra costs as “all costs in terms of time, effort, and resources
spent by the client organization that go beyond the actual payments to the vendor (p. 335
emphasis added),” Dibbern et al. (2008) drew on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory and
the Resource Based View (RBV) in conducting a study of six offshored IT related projects to
India. Their results indicated that the client faced extra costs in four types of activities involved
in offshored projects: 1) requirements specification and design, 2) knowledge transfer, 3) control,
and 4) coordination. Further, whenever projects required higher levels of client-specific
knowledge, the incurred extra costs were substantially higher than when general knowledge was
needed. Interestingly, the extra costs were primarily due to increased efforts in managing
knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor and not due to the traditionally assumed logic
(TCE based) of opportunistic behavior by vendors. They also found that a supplier’s prior
experiences with related client projects reduced the level of extra costs but could not fully offset
the increase in extra costs when the projects were highly client-specific. Finally, cultural and
geographic distance between client and supplier increased a client’s extra costs. Cultural and
geographic distance also interacted with level of required client-specific knowledge, such that
the effect of client specific knowledge requirements on greater extra costs was even stronger
when cultural and geographic distance was greater.
In summary, there is a good indication that firms often accrue cost and non-cost benefits
from offshoring. Both industry reports and academic research suggest that the benefits of
offshoring are indeed important for organizations. However, while there are more than a few
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instances of success stories related to offshoring, some empirical studies suggest that success is
elusive and often contingent on a variety of factors.

3.3 Challenges and Risks of Offshoring
Parallel to these, are a collection of prescriptive and empirical studies which highlight the
risk factors associated with offshoring. Appendix 2 summarizes some of the major challenges
and risks related to domestic outsourcing, offshoring, and netsourcing. Domestic outsourcing and
netsourcing are included to provide a frame of reference for ascertaining challenges and risks
which are unique to offshoring.
As detailed in Appendix 2, scholars attribute some risks to the clients and suggest that the
onus lies on them to ensure success with sourcing arrangements. Examples include developing
and retaining appropriate capabilities in-house, effectively managing suppliers, having realistic
expectations of cost savings, and drafting and negotiating proper contracts (e.g., Bahli and
Rivard, 2003; Earl, 1996). Other challenges and risks are supplier-specific and include lack of
capabilities, financial viability, ability to attract and retain human capital (e.g., Jurison, 1995;
Sullivan and Ngwenyama, 2005). Yet others are clearly endemic to market and hybrid sourcing
arrangements – that is, those related to the transactions, relationships, and agency problems.
These include hidden costs, supplier lock-in, difficulties in performance easurement/monitoring,
opportunistic behavior, communication problems, and differences in organizational cultures
(e.g., Bahli and Rivard, 2003; Earl, 1996; Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; Taylor, 2006).
Appendix 2 also indicates that while the three sourcing initiatives share many similar
challenges and risks, some are particular to offshoring. For example, the three factors related to
socio-political risks, national culture differences, and negative impact on client image are
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especially related to offshoring (e.g., Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; Kliem, 2004; Sakthivel, 2007).
Similarly, some risks and challenges such as communication problems, data security, and
intellectual property protection become more severe in the offshore context (Goodman and
Ramer, 2007; Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008). Further, factors such as communication problems and
cultural differences may interact with other elements in the offshore context and can significantly
erode the possible cost related benefits (Dibbern et al., 2008).

3.4 Captive Offshoring
The sections 3.1 to 3.3 primarily dealt with offshore outsourcing, i.e. engaging an offshore
supplier for IT and BP work. Captive offshoring, on the other hand, refers to use of wholly
owned and operated subsidiaries located in offshore locations that perform work for the parent
company (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Oshri, Kotlarsky, Rottman, and Willcocks, 2009a).
Research on captive offshoring is relatively limited as compared with offshore outsourcing
(Oshri et al., 2009a; Oshri, Kotlarsky, and Willcocks, 2009b). Nevertheless, some work in this
area addresses the extent of captive offshoring, reasons for engaging in captive arrangements, the
different types of captive arrangements, and challenges in captive offshoring.
Early research indicated that the extent of captive offshoring for IT related services was
rather limited. For example, Lewin and Peeters (2006a) reported that 89% of IT related offshore
implementations were [offshore] outsourced while only 11% were part of captive arrangements.
This is compared to 69% percent of captive operations for finance and accounting business
processes (Lewin and Peeters, 2006a). However, Carmel and Agarwal (2002) observe that
captive IT offshoring was more likely to be done by IT firms. Four out of eight major IT firms in
their study had extensive captive offshoring operations ranging from 400 to 2000 professionals
working in offshore captive centers (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002). Based on interviews with
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senior executives, the authors summarized the reasons these firms engaged in captive
arrangements as resembling the classic “build versus buy” arguments. The firms preferred
“having vertical integration and an internal locus of control (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002 p. 72).”
Specific reasons identified by respondents include faster ramp-up times, advantages in terms of
security and intellectual property protection, and compatibility with internal software
engineering methodologies and work processes. The authors add that the technology companies
also wanted to maintain strong in-house technical capabilities (Carmel and Agarwal, 2002).
From a broader perspective, Oshri et al. (2009a) report that there are two primary reasons
for investing in a captive subsidiary offshore. One is to reduce costs (relative to domestic
operation) and the other to seek penetration in growth areas. Other reasons include access to
qualified personnel (Oshri et al., 2009b). Correspondingly, firms may pursue different types of
captive arrangements or strategies that go beyond the basic captive center model where the
parent company wholly owns the captive operations and the captive center provides services
only to the parent firm.
Oshri et al. (2009b) identify three such broad strategies: hybrid, shared, and divested.
Hybrid strategy entails the captive center providing services to the parent firm but in so doing it
may further outsource (to local vendors in the offshore destination) traditionally non-core
activities. The benefits include higher value work for the parent company while at the same time
helping reduce overall costs. Shared strategy means that the captive center provides services to
the parent firm but also seeks external clients. The rationale behind such arrangements is that the
captive center becomes a profit center while at the same time reducing the overall unit costs by
increasing the volume of work performed by the center. Divestment strategy may be adopted
when the captive center has developed large scale operations which have brought the costs down
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to the scale of offshore vendors. In such a scenario, the parent company assesses divestment
when it is assured that the captive center will continue to provide services and the service levels
will not be negatively affected. In addition to these three broad strategies, captive centers may
take on other arrangements. These include “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) models where
offshore suppliers initially setup and run a captive center only to later transfer it to a client based
on certain terms and conditions. Joint-ventures are also possible but typically carry the BOT
arrangement (Oshri and Corbett, 2011; Oshri et al., 2009a; Oshri et al., 2009b).
Overall, firms engage in captive offshoring arrangements primarily to maintain internal
control, protect intellectual property, reduce the exposure of core competencies to third-party
suppliers, access qualified personnel, and increase access to new markets (Carmel and Tjia,
2005; Kotlarsky and Oshri, 2008). At the same time, firms have been reported to face significant
challenges of increasing costs, high levels of employee attrition, and lack of integration with the
firm’s overall global strategy (Oshri et al., 2009b).

3.5 Institutional Explanations of Outsourcing and Offshoring decisions
The institutional perspective in a broad sense deals with the processes that define and
explain institutionalization in organizational environments and the influences of such processes
on organizations (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). There are several variants of institutional theory
which differ in their approaches and focuses (Scott, 1987). The approach most commonly
studied in the IS literature deals with the impacts of the institutional context on organizations
(Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). The premise of this approach holds that organizational actions are
the product of ideas, beliefs, and values that originate in the institutional context (Greenwood
and Hinings, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977 p. 340)
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observe that “organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by
prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized society.
Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of
the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.”
Prominent among this approach is work on Institutional Isomorphism (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983) which seeks to explain and predict homogeneity in organizational forms and
practices within a given organizational field. The term isomorphism captures the process of
homogenization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three
mechanisms though which institutional isomorphic change occurs: 1) coercive isomorphism, 2)
mimetic isomorphism, and 3) normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism stems from formal
and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are
dependent and through the cultural expectations in the society within which organizations
function. Mimetic isomorphism is when organizations model themselves on other organizations.
This results from uncertainty which acts as a powerful force driving imitation when
organizational technologies are poorly understood, goals are ambiguous, or when the
environment creates symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Normative isomorphism is said to be primarily a product of
professionalization in terms of formal education and professional networks.
As mentioned earlier, IS literature primarily draws on work which explicates the
institutional effects on organizational processes and structures and particularly the isomorphic
pressures which bring about such changes (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). Scholars have addressed
varied aspects such as IT innovation, IS development and implementation, and IT adoption and
use (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009). In this section, we discuss the Outsourcing literature which
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either explicitly invokes such aspects of institutional theory or utilizes it to provide post-hoc
explanations of outsourcing decisions. We include institutional explanations of broader
outsourcing decisions as opposed to only offshoring decisions as literature on institutional
explanations for offshoring, in particular, is rather sparse.
Conceptualizing outsourcing as an “administrative innovation,” Loh and Venkatraman
(1992) analyzed 60 IT outsourcing contracts reported in the press between the period 1988 and
1990. Testing competing diffusion models pertaining to the influence sources responsible for
diffusion of IT outsourcing, they found that outsourcing behavior of other organizations (what
Loh and Venkatraman termed ‘internal sources of influence’) was a better explanatory
mechanism of the diffusion pattern of IT outsourcing than the influences from mass media
reports and vendor communications (i.e. ‘external-influences’). Further, they found strong
evidence that mimetic influences dominated the diffusion patterns in the post-Kodak regime of
their sample. That is, following the landmark announcement of Kodak to outsource, firms clearly
displayed imitative behavior in outsourcing. Loh and Venkatraman (1992) discussed this so
called “Kodak-effect” as being consistent with the “social visibility” related arguments of
Mahajan et al. (1988) and with the ideas of institutional isomorphism presented by DiMaggio
and Powell (1983).
Hu, Saunders, and Gebelt (1997) replicated the Loh and Venkatraman (1992) study with a
broader archival data set of 175 firms which outsourced IS functions during 1985 to 1995.
However, they found no evidence of the “Kodak-effect” but reported that mixed-influence (i.e.
both internal and external influences sources) is a dominant influence factor in the IT
outsourcing diffusion process (Hu et al., 1997). Regardless of the difference in findings, both
studies indicate that institutional influences from peer organizations, media reports, and supplier
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communications played a role in organizations engaging in outsourcing. Loh and Venkatraman
(1992) and Hu et al. (1997) do not indicate whether outsourcing in their samples involved
offshore outsourcing.
Miranda and Kim (2006) reported that their study departed from prior outsourcing studies
adopting an institutional perspective in that they considered institutional structures emanating
from within the organization as opposed to the traditional focus on external structures and their
influence on organizations. Their focus was to understand whether professional or political
contexts (in a surveyed sample of 214 city governments) fostered differential application of the
Transaction Cost Economics logic to outsourcing decisions. The authors hypothesized that those
city governments which operate in a professional logic will follow Transaction Cost Economics’
core prescriptions and those operating under a political logic will follow the opposite. That is,
differences between the professional and political institutional contexts will lead to different
paradigms of outsourcing related decisions. The authors found mixed support for their model.
The institutional context moderated the TCE variables of opportunism, transaction frequency,
and bounded rationality. However, the effects of core TCE variables such as asset specificity and
uncertainty remained unaltered by the institutional logic being followed. The authors attributed
their results, which were both counter to TCE and to their hypothesized moderating impact of the
institutional context, to resource munificence and other characteristics of their sample of city
government organizations. Miranda and Kim’s (2006) study did not indicate whether the
outsourcing budgets (their dependent variable) of city governments included offshore
outsourcing.
Jayatilaka and Hirschheim (2009) conducted an interpretive field study of the influences
of institutional processes and IT-driven considerations on the changes in organizations’ IT
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sourcing arrangements overtime. The authors found that changes in sourcing arrangements they
observed were often exclusively associated with either an institutional orientation or an ITdriven orientation but rarely both. The authors drew on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive,
mimetic and normative pressures of isomorphic change to understand institutional influences. On
the other hand, they viewed IT-driven considerations as non-cost aspects such as systems
development efficiency, technology access, productivity, business support from IT, and IT
effectiveness (p. 98). In terms of the sourcing outcomes (satisfaction with IT sourcing
arrangements) the authors contend that satisfaction depended more on what orientation
(institutional versus IT-driven) firms had than on the actual IT sourcing arrangements
themselves. Further, an institutional orientation is likely to lead to a less satisfactory sourcing
arrangement than an IT-driven orientation – although just having an IT-driven orientation on its
own may not be sufficient (Jayatilaka and Hirschheim, 2009 p. 101).
Ang and Cummings (1997) was the only study which directly questioned the then
prevalent view that organizations are passive players in light of institutional influences. Taking
institutional influences from peer banks and federal regulators for information systems
outsourcing within banks as their study context, the authors contended that despite strong
institutional influences for outsourcing, banks may enact different strategic responses to such
pressures. Specifically, they studied economic factors such as perceived economic gain from
conformity to institutional pressures, financial capacity to resist institutional pressures, and
transaction costs implied by conformity as moderators of the relationships between institutional
influences and banks’ extent of IT outsourcing. They further hypothesized that the size of a bank
will affect each of the interactions between institutional influence and the above mentioned
moderators (i.e. three way interactions). Their study was restricted to the banking industry and
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employed survey data from 243 banks in the United States. Given their dependent variable was
dichotomous (outsourcing or insourcing) the authors employed a series of hierarchical moderated
logistic regression analyses to test separate models related to each of their two-way and threeway interaction hypotheses. Their results overwhelmingly indicate that when institutional
influences involved potential regulatory sanctions, banks were mostly likely to comply with
pressures to outsource. Further, this pattern was almost similar for both large and small banks.
Ang and Cumming’s (1997) finding is consistent with Oliver’s (1991) assertion that
acquiescence to institutional pressures best serves the organization’s interests when legal
coercion is high and/or when it is strictly enforced. With respect to influences from peer banks,
Ang and Cummings (1997) found that banks responded to internal considerations more than to
institutional pressures from peers. In addition, larger banks tended to pay more attention to
economic contingencies than smaller banks when institutional influences from peers were
considered. Overall, while Ang and Cummings (1997) acknowledge Oliver’s (1991) ideas of a
range of possible strategic responses by organizations, they only consider whether organizations
outsource (acquiesce) or insource (defy). Further, given their study was restricted to the banking
industry, it is unclear how variation in regulatory pressures, for example, when institutional
enforcement, vigilance, and sanctions for noncompliance vary or are more moderate (Oliver,
1991); may have changed the results reported in this study. Ang and Cummings (1997) also do
not indicate whether outsourcing in their sample of banks involved offshore outsourcing.

3.6 Literature Summary
Overall, the literature suggests that while labor costs savings remains the primary strategic
driver of offshoring, a variety of other strategic considerations have evolved. These range from
access to qualified personnel to core activities such as innovation (Lewin et al., 2009; Willcocks
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et al., 2010). The review also indicates that there are a range of benefits from offshoring (e.g.,
Lewin and Peeters, 2006a; Lewin and Peeters, 2006b; Tate et al., 2009) but there is substantial
variation in the outcomes of offshoring in terms of the benefits derived by client firms (e.g., King
and Torkzadeh, 2008; Lacity and Rottman, 2008) and that firms often have to contend with
significant challenges and risks.
Noticeably absent from the literature is an explicit consideration of the broader
institutional environment in relation to either the drivers or consequences of offshoring,
especially when institutional processes against offshoring are concerned. Although the broader
Information Systems (IS) literature in general and IT outsourcing literature in particular has
drawn on institutional theory (e.g., Hu et al., 1997; Loh and Venkatraman, 1992), a majority of
prior work has tended to exclusively focus on explaining processes of conformity and
isomorphism. See Mignerat and Rivard (2009) for a broader critique of institutional research in
IS. While such work is immensely valuable, it downplays the roles of organizations’ concerns
with respect to their task environments and active agency in their adaptation to the institutional
environments (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1985).
This research attempts to address this gap by studying the impact of the nature of antioffshoring institutional pressures on organizational responsiveness. Further, it explicitly
considers internal and strategic considerations of organizations to account for organizational
active agency and strategic adaptation in light of institutional expectations. We next discuss the
theoretical framework.
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4

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework integrates institutional and resource dependence
theories to demonstrate how organizations’ strategic responses may vary from passive
conformity to active resistance in response to institutional pressures. The level of responsiveness
in turn depends on a set of factors related to the nature and context of the institutional pressures
themselves (Oliver, 1991). The framework addressed a criticism of the institutional perspective
that it tended to downplay the role of organizational self-interests and active agency in
organizational adaptation and responses to institutional pressures and expectations (Covaleski
and Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1987). For example,
Scott (1987; 1991) argued that just as is the case with an organization’s technical or task
environments, an organization may be expected to exercise ‘strategic choice’(Child, 1972) in
relation to its institutional environments and when responding to institutional pressures (Scott,
1991). Oliver suggested that institutional theory can and should accommodate interest-seeking,
active behavior of organizations and this is possible if “organizations’ responses to institutional
pressures and expectations are not assumed to be invariably passive and conforming across all
institutional conditions (1991, p. 146).” Building on this argument, Oliver (1991) identified a
continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures. She theorized that, depending on a
number of factors, such as the degree to which institutional pressures constrain organizational
discretion and the dependence of organizations on institutional constituents, organizations may
respond to institutional pressures in a variety of modes ranging from passive compliance with –
to – active defiance of institutional pressures (Goodstein, 1994).
Oliver (1991) suggests that the predictive dimensions related to this conformity or resistance
surround both the willingness and the ability of organizations to conform to institutional
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pressures. These dimensions take into account the nature of the institutional pressures and
considerations of the organizational task environments (Goodstein, 1994). Oliver (1991)
describes the characteristics of these institutional determinants of strategic responses in terms of
five factors: cause, constituents, content, control, and context.
The cause of the institutional pressures refers to the underlying rationale for such pressures.
It is the set of expectations or intended objectives that lead institutional stakeholders such as the
state, to exert pressures on organizations. These reasons for external pressures may be oriented
toward 1) enhancing an organization’s legitimacy or social fitness (for example, pressures on
organizations to ‘go green’); or 2) improving its efficiency or economic fitness (for example,
exhorting not-for-profit organizations to be more ‘business like’). To the extent an organization
perceives that institutional demands can enhance its legitimacy or economic fitness, it is more
likely to be responsive and less likely to resist institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Oliver, 1991).
Aspects related to the institutional constituents (including the state, professions, political
and special interest groups, and the general public, among others) themselves may also impact
the level of organizational resistance to institutional pressures. These aspects include 1) the
degree of multiplicity of constituent expectations and 2) the dependence of organizations on
external constituents. To the extent that the institutional field is fragmented as a result of
divergence or multiplicity in constituents’ expectations, full compliance with institutional
pressures will be difficult and resistance more feasible (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010;
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Resistance to institutional pressures is also more likely when
organizational dependence on external actors is limited or when the external constituents have
lower perceived power (resource derived or normatively sanctioned). The greater the extent to
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which institutional constituents control resources or exert power the more difficult it will be for
organizations to resist their expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978).
Two dimensions related to the content of the pressures themselves also predict the degree of
resistance: 1) The degree to which institutional pressures conflict with organizational goals, and
2) the extent to which the institutional pressures constrain organizational discretion.
Organizations are less likely to resist to the extent that institutional expectations are compatible
or consistent with internal organizational goals and plans. Similarly, resistance is more likely if
compliance with institutional expectations means a loss of autonomy in terms of managerial
discretion (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990) and internal control over processes and outputs
(Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The nature of institutional control, that is, the means by which institutional pressures are
exerted on organizations will also predict organizational response. Oliver (1991) identifies at
least two distinct processes by which pressures are imposed: 1) legal coercion and 2) voluntary
diffusion. When broader institutional expectations begin to get shaped into the force of law or
government mandate, organizations are made more aware of the public interests (Oliver, 1991).
To the extent that consequences of nonconformity are severe and the legal mandate is broadly
applicable and enforced, compliance with institutional pressures is more likely (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). While regulatory mandates are imposed by means of authority,
institutional pressures or expectations may also arise when the norms and expectations have been
voluntarily adopted and diffused through an organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Goodstein, 1994; Scott, 1987).
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Finally, at least two aspects of an organization’s environmental context, 1) environmental
uncertainty and 2) the degree of interconnectedness, may also affect organizations’ conformity or
resistance to institutional demands and expectations. When the environmental context of
institutional influence is highly uncertain, organizations are more likely to comply with
institutional pressures so as to reduce uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Similarly the extent to which the institutional environment is highly
interconnected it facilitates widespread diffusion of institutional norms and demands and
increases the likelihood of conformity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
Oliver, 1991).
In summary, Oliver’s (1991) framework identifies the five institutional factors of cause,
constituents, content, control, and context and the 10 predictive dimensions (2 each) within
them as determinants of the levels of organizational responsiveness to institutional pressures.
Oliver (1991) suggested that depending on the study context, empirical applications of this
framework may either predict the degree of responsiveness or focus on individual strategic
responses (such as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation). In line
with prior studies (Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, and Justis, 2008; Milliken, Martins, and Morgan, 1998)
we limit this model to predicting the degree of organizational responsiveness to institutional
pressures and examine dimensions of the institutional factors which are most pertinent to this
study’s context (e.g., Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995).
Using Oliver’s (1991) framework, prior research has examined pressures which required
organizations to alter their processes or outputs (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
These studies include explanations of organizational responses to broad institutional pressures
for employer involvement in work-family issues (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995;
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Milliken et al., 1998). Yet others have partly drawn on this theory in studying specific pressures
from interest groups (i.e. a single institutional constituent group) attempting to influence the
restaurant industry to reduce fat content in their food offerings (Julian et al., 2008). Overall, this
framework is suitable for studying questions of the form “how do organizations strategically
respond to institutional pressures and what factors affect organizational responses (Goodstein,
1994p. 352).” Thus, this framework lends itself to the study of anti-offshoring institutional
pressures which impact how organizations source information technology and business
processes.
In the next section, we develop hypotheses incorporating specific dimensions of the five
institutional factors which predict organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional
pressures.

5

HYPOTHESES

Incorporating Oliver’s (1991) theoretical framework discussed earlier, we posit that the level
of organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures will depend on five
factors pertaining to the nature of such pressures mapped across the respective predictive
dimensions under cause, constituents, content, control, and context. These are 1) Social
Legitimacy (cause), or organizational expectations that greater responsiveness will enhance an
organization’s legitimacy or social fitness. 2) Dependence on Federal and State Governments
(constituents), the degree to which organizations are dependent on pressuring constituents. 3)
Organizational Plans for Offshore Portfolio (content), that is, an organization’s plans to increase,
maintain, or decrease its offshore headcount. 4) Complying Actions of other Firms (control), that
is, knowledge of focal executives that executives at other firms are lowering the extent of
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offshore engagements. 5) Regulatory Environment Uncertainty (context), the degree to which
executives perceive the regulatory environment with respect to offshoring as unpredictable. In
addition, we incorporate 6) Organizational Success with Offshoring as a key organizational
consideration with respect to offshoring. Success with Offshoring is also posited to moderate the
effects of all five institutional factors. The hypotheses outlined below specify these effects and
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships within the theoretical framework.

FIGURE 1
Hypothesized Relationships
Success with Offshoring
(ORGANIZATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS)
(-)

Social Legitimacy

(-)
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(+)
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Government
(CONSTITUENTS)

(-)
(+ )
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
TO ANTI-OFFSHORING
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES

(-)

Organizational Plans for
Offshore Portfolio

(-)
(-)

(CONTENT)
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Complying Actions of
other Firms

(+)

(CONTROL)
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Regulatory Environment
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Controls
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US Firms vs. others
Captive Operations vs. others
Senior most respondents vs. others
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures
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Social Legitimacy and Organizational Responsiveness
As discernable from the analysis of institutional pressures against offshoring discussed
earlier, underlying these pressures seems to be a set of normative beliefs based on the rationale
that organizations should play a more active role in reducing the overall level of unemployment
in the United States instead of exacerbating it by moving jobs offshore. Such a rationale and the
ensuing pressures seem akin to requiring organizations to reduce pollution, deliver safe products
and services, to promote health and safety of employees, or adopt work-family initiatives – all of
which are geared toward making organizations more socially fit or acceptable (Goodstein, 1994;
Ingram and Simons, 1995; Oliver, 1991). Oliver (1991) suggests that the choice between
conformity and resistance to institutional pressures will depend on the degree to which the
organization agrees with and values the intentions that institutional constituents are attempting to
achieve in pressuring the organization to be more socially accountable. This line of reasoning is
consistent with Suchman’s (1995) arguments that organizations conform to their environments to
obtain either or both pragmatic or moral legitimacy and can be understood based on both a
strategic view of instrumentally managing legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978) and the institutional view of obtaining legitimacy as the essence of conformity to
institutional processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995).
When an organization anticipates that conformity will enhance its social fitness (that is, it
would be viewed as more socially responsible or accountable), acquiescence will be the most
probable response to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). To the extent that organizational
actors perceive that not engaging in offshoring or reducing the current extent of offshoring will
help enhance the organization’s social legitimacy in the eyes of institutional and other
stakeholders, it is more likely to conform to institutional pressures against offshoring. That is, if
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an organization believes that it will be viewed as socially responsible and as “doing the right
thing” by “not sending jobs overseas” it is likely to lean toward conformity. On the other hand
when organizations are skeptical about the social legitimacy or strategic utility of conformity,
they are more likely to resist (Oliver, 1991). Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from
conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, the greater the organizational
responsiveness.
Dependence on Governments and Organizational Responsiveness
The power-dependence relationships between an organization and critical institutional
constituents also play an important role in organizational resistance to institutional pressures.
Drawing on resource dependence theory, Oliver (1991) suggests that an organization will be less
likely to resist external pressures when it is dependent on the sources of these pressures (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). Theorists have further observed that power accrues to those who control
resources (Pfeffer, 1981), and that the possession of such power makes a stakeholder important
to managers (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997). In the context of this study, one of the most
important institutional stakeholders is the Government or specifically, Federal and relevant State
Government(s). Government and government policies enacted through legislation have control
over critical resources that shape firms’ competitive environments (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). As a
result there is substantial interdependence between a firm’s economic or competitive
environment and public policy (Baron, 1995). Further, government decision makers have the
ability to alter the size and structure of markets, to affect the demand of products and services,
and to alter the cost structure of firms through various types of legislation (Hillman and Hitt,
1999). Governments have power to channel valuable resources toward or away from a firm and
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to use multiple “carrots and sticks” (e.g. tax, data privacy/security, and labor laws) to pressure
firms (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006).
Further, as issues such as offshoring, progress through local to national public awareness
with increased media exposure and interest group involvement, they eventually enter the
legislative or regulatory arena (Greening and Gray, 1994; Mollitor, 1977). Legislative attempts,
such as the S.3816 - Creating American Jobs and Ending Offshoring Act in United States Senate
exemplify such eventual transition. The above bill was proposed with a specific aim to reduce or
eliminate tax benefits to corporations that send jobs overseas and to increase tax benefits to those
that create domestic jobs. The corporate political activity literature suggests that firms often take
pulse of the regulatory climate with respect to issues that are salient to them in anticipation of
public policy changes (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Mollitor, 1977).
In sum, to the extent organizations are highly dependent on Federal or State Governments
they are less like to resist demands for reduced offshoring or fulfillment of government contracts
using local labor as opposed to offshore labor. On the other hand, when dependence on Federal
or State Governments is low more resistant strategies represent minimal risks to organizational
interests because the organization is no longer held captive by its dependence (Oliver, 1991). In
such cases partial conformity or even avoidance in the form of ceremonial conformity will be
more likely (Oliver, 1991). This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of organizational dependence on Federal and State
Governments, the greater the organizational responsiveness.
Organizational Plans for Offshore Portfolio and Organizational Responsiveness
Along with cause and aspects related to the constituents, the content of the institutional
pressures is also relevant. One dimension of the content of pressures is the consistency or
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congruence of institutional expectations with organizational goals and policies (Goodstein, 1994;
Oliver, 1991). Organizations will be more responsive to institutional expectations when such
expectations are compatible with internal goals and plans and less likely to be responsive when
internal logics of production and technical considerations are at odds with institutional
expectations. In such instances institutional expectations may be precluded by organizational
goals and policies that give greater weight to technical and/or economic standards against which
performance of most organizations is primarily assessed (Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Ingram
and Simons (1995) showed that public sector organizations where more likely to be responsive
than private sector organizations to institutional expectations regarding organizational
involvement in work-family issues. The authors conclude that organizations with goals
consistent with institutional pressure are more likely to respond (p. 1476).
Organizational plans with respect to offshoring may be shaped with respect to a variety of
internal considerations. For example, given the pervasiveness of IT and its operational and
strategic impact, IT sourcing decisions are often substantive for organizations. In fact the
common notion of IT Sourcing, as “the organizational arrangement instituted for obtaining IS
services and the management of resources and activities required for producing these services
(Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, and Bandula, 2004 p. 11), ” suggests that IT sourcing portfolios
need to be carefully managed vis-à-vis the organization’s best interests. Further, as mentioned
earlier, organizations may engage in offshoring for a variety of reasons such as for better
managing costs (King and Torkzadeh 2008) to gain access to expertise/skills of global suppliers,
for business or process performance improvements, and for access to new markets in offshore
destinations (e.g., Carmel and Tjia 2005; Kaiser and Hawk 2004; Rao, Poole, Raven and
Lockwood 2006; Sobol and Apte 1995). Similarly, organizations may choose to reduce or
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eliminate offshore engagements simply because there is no more need (e.g., major projects have
been completed), or because there are other technical and economic considerations such as lack
of desired cost savings, problems with more than expected extra costs, high turnover in offshore
locations, and problems associated with knowledge transfer, among others (Dibbern et al., 2008;
Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007). To the
extent organizational plans with respect to offshoring are to increase its overall offshore portfolio
based on its internal logic, such plans will be at odds with institutional expectations to reduce
offshoring. On the other hand if organizational plans are to decrease its overall offshore portfolio
then institutional expectations are in line with organizational goals—leading to greater
responsiveness (cf., Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Thus, if an organization plans to increase its
offshore portfolio it is less likely to be responsive to anti-offshoring institutional expectations.
This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Organizations that plan to increase their offshore portfolio will be less responsive
to anti-offshoring pressures than organizations that plan to maintain or reduce their offshore
portfolio.
Complying Actions of Other Firms and Organizational Responsiveness
Institutional control refers to the mechanisms through which pressures are imposed on
organizations. Oliver (1991) discusses two such distinct processes: legal coercion and voluntary
diffusion. In the absence of an overarching legal mandate prohibiting offshoring16, the extent, to
which the phasing out or elimination of offshoring has voluntary been diffused in an
organizational field may become the primary mechanism through which influence occurs (cf.,
Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). As organizations adopt norms or practices they become models

16

There have been attempts at legislation to curb offshoring at both the federal and state levels in the United States.
However, to our knowledge, there is yet to be a broadly applicable and potently enforced law which directly forbids
offshoring. See the discussion on legislative attempts against offshoring in Section 2.
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for other organizations in an organizational field, reduce uncertainty with a specific innovation,
and the norms and practices they adopt become increasingly legitimated (Goodstein, 1994;
Zucker, 1987). This line of reasoning is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) view on
the mimetic mechanisms underlying organizational conformity. Overall, the more broadly
diffused an institutional expectation or practice has become, the greater the likelihood that
organizations will conform. On the other hand, the less widespread a set of values, practices, or
expectations, the more likely that organizations will be skeptical and the greater the likelihood
that organizations will resist (Oliver, 1991).
While the relevance of what is happening with respect to offshoring in an organization’s
field is clear from the above, it is important to note that institutional pressures are often mediated
by the organization’s immediate social structural context in terms of social network ties
(Westpahl and Zajac, 2001). That is, in responding to external pressures, senior executives and
managers are often influenced by information obtained from leaders of other firms in their
network (cf., Westpahl and Zajac, 2001). In other words, for executives, a more nuanced
indication of an impending drift away from offshoring, if any, may come from leaders of other
firms in their social network. Prior research supports this line of reasoning. For example, Davis
(1991) demonstrated how direct communication between managers across firms provided a
mechanism of vicarious learning for focal firms with respect to the potential benefits and
drawbacks of adopting “poison pills” as a takeover defense. Similarly, Westpahl and Zajac
(2001) found that the likelihood of a focal firm decoupling stock buyback programs from actual
practice increased when other firms in its network had also previously done so.
In sum, the extent to which the ideas of moving away from or further toward offshoring
have diffused in an organizational field will determine an organization’s response to institutional
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pressures against offshoring. However, the relationships of a focal firm’s executives with senior
managers at other firms provide the mechanism for vicarious learning--they provide information
about the extent to which such diffusion has occurred and the potential benefits/drawbacks of
different responses. Thus, to the extent that executives from the focal firm believe that senior
managers at other firms in their network are moving away from offshoring, the focal firm is
likely to follow suit. This notion is in line with both a network embeddedness perspective
(Granovetter, 1985; Westpahl and Zajac, 2001) and a mimetic processes view in which
administrators under uncertainty regarding the appropriate response will draw on and heed to
what others are doing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Milliken, 1987). This leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that
executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring, the greater the organizational
responsiveness.
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty and Organizational Responsiveness
Finally, Oliver’s (1991) framework maintains that the environmental context within
which pressures are exerted on organizations is also likely to be a determinant of organizational
responsiveness. Specifically, the regulatory environment uncertainty with respect to offshoring is
predicted to affect the level of organizational responsiveness. Both resource dependence and
institutional theorists have long argued that decision makers within organizations have strong
preferences for certainty, stability, and predictability in organizational life (DiMaggio, 1988;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Zucker, 1987). Oliver (1991) suggests that when the environmental context of institutional
influence is highly uncertain and unpredictable, an organization will exert greater effort to
reestablish control and stability over future organizational outcomes. In such cases when
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uncertainty is high, she predicts that organizations are less likely to actively resist and more
likely to conform. However, as uncertainty diminishes, the need for stability, security and control
decreases and organizations grow more confident in their predictions about future resource
acquisition, legitimacy, and organizational outcomes (Oliver, 1991).
When top-level managers perceive a high level of uncertainty in terms of what actions
constituents such as government regulatory bodies, might take (Milliken, 1987) they are more
likely to err in favor of stability and control over their sourcing portfolio and eliminate or reduce
the extent of offshoring. That is, managers are more likely to insulate the organization from
unpredictable shifts in the environment and/or to diversify (their sourcing portfolio), by
considering more domestic sourcing options vis-à-vis offshoring, so as to diminish the
organization’s vulnerability to conditions which are poorly understood (cf. Milliken, 1987). On
the other hand, when perceived environmental uncertainty in terms of future regulatory action is
low, managers are likely to view offshoring as less risky in terms of stability and control over
their sourcing portfolio and more likely to resist institutional pressures against offshoring.
Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: The lower the level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State
Government(s) with respect to offshoring, the lower the organizational responsiveness.
Organizational Success with Offshoring and Organizational Responsiveness
Oliver’s (1991) framework explicitly adopts the assumption that organizational
conformity to institutional pressures is a strategic choice and acknowledges the importance of
both institutional and technical (i.e. task environment) determinants to this choice (Goodstein,
1994). The implicit theoretical rationale underlying the level of responsiveness to institutional
expectations surrounds both the willingness and ability of organizations to conform to the
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institutional environment (Oliver 1991). In this sense, an organization’s task environment
considerations and strategic imperatives become crucial ingredients in how organizations
respond to institutional expectations strategically. Prior research has contributed to this line of
theorizing in at least two different ways. First, for example, Goodstein (1994) incorporated the
technical-economic considerations in an explicit fashion along with Oliver’s (1991) five
institutional factors, in predicting organizational responses. Specifically, he demonstrated that to
the extent institutional expectations were strong and the organizational actors perceived that the
benefits of compliance outweighed the costs of compliance; acquiescence was the most likely
response. Second, researchers have attempted to explicitly include managerial cognition into the
mix by suggesting that variance in organizational compliance maybe in part due to the
differences in managers’ level of attention to issues and how they interpret such issues vis-à-vis
their organization’s technical/economic and strategic considerations (Julian et al., 2008; Milliken
et al., 1998).
Both streams depict some aspects of the role of active agency which institutional theorists
had opined for (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), as it
comes into play when organizations consider the responses to institutional pressures. However,
both are silent on how active agency surfaces with respect to the strategic drivers and outcomes
of the very organizational actions which are the subject of institutional pressures to begin with.
To elaborate, managers often have certain strategic objectives in mind that they translate into
certain decisions and actions geared toward attainment of such objectives (e.g., Hutzschereuter,
Pedersen, and Volberda, 2007; Lewin et al., 2009). It is unclear, then, how active agency
manifests itself when 1) the very actions toward attainment of certain strategic goals become the
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subject of counter institutional pressures, and 2) there is variation in the outcomes of such
strategic actions which may have implications for the organization itself.
Offshoring provides a fertile context for the evaluation of such aspects of the internal
considerations of organizations in responding to institutional expectations. As discussed in the
literature review section, the most dominant strategic driver of offshoring reported in the
literature is to realize cost savings through labor arbitrage (e.g., Kaiser and Hawk, 2004; Khan
and Fitzgerald, 2004; King and Torkzadeh, 2008; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995).
However, studies increasingly report other strategic motives such as access to skilled personnel
offshore, attaining business or process performance improvements, and access to new markets as
part of a larger global strategy, lead firms to offshoring (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Kaiser and
Hawk, 2004; Rao et al., 2006; Sobol and Apte, 1995). For example, based on the ORN
longitudinal survey, Arie Lewin and his colleagues report that offshoring practices have evolved
at a dramatic pace. By 2008 offshoring had become a major strategic concern of top management
at many companies and many existing and planned offshore implementations dealt with
innovation related activities such as research and development, new product and software
development, and knowledge-intensive processes (Lewin et al., 2009). While these strategic
motives may be driving companies to offshore, scholars have also reported substantial variation
in the outcomes of such strategic endeavors (Dibbern et al., 2008; Lewin et al., 2009; Lewin and
Peeters, 2006b; Manning, Massini, and Lewin, 2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008). It is this
variation in outcomes of past offshoring efforts with respect to various strategic motives is what
we suggest will also play a role in organization’s strategic responses to institutional pressures.
This is both in addition to and in conjunction with the five institutional factors described earlier.
Specifically, we contend that past success with offshoring will both have a direct effect on
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organizational responsiveness to institutional pressures against offshoring and also moderate the
effects of the five institutional factors. We specify the related hypotheses next.
As noted earlier, a variety of firm level and environmental conditions have reportedly
driven firms to consider offshoring. Prominent among these are lower costs, faster delivery
speeds, ability to refocus on core business, increasing access to qualified personnel, accessing
suppliers’ technical capabilities, and achieving process improvements (e.g., Carmel and
Agarwal, 2002; Carmel and Tjia, 2005; Lacity and Rottman, 2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008).
Managers have long been required to contain costs, ramp up projects quickly, find qualified and
experienced personnel in fast moving technologies, and to innovate constantly (Carmel and
Agarwal, 2002). Such requirements seemed to have intensified over-time. For example, a recent
Gartner Inc. report17 suggests that CIOs are unlikely to see any increases in IT budgets but will
be expected to do more than ever before – keep IT costs low while more rapidly respond to
business changes, regulatory compliance and innovation. IT will be forced “to make the business
of the past more productive, while IT must invest in the future at a rate that does not grow IT
costs faster than the business (p. 13).” Similarly, scholars indicate that offshoring may be a key
way forward in the global race for talent and innovation (Lewin et al., 2009).
However, many firms fail to realize the desired benefits from offshoring (Ranganathan
and Balaji, 2007). Scholars indicate that it takes a tremendous amount of detailed management
on both the client and supplier sides to realize the expected benefits of offshore outsourcing
(Rottman and Lacity, 2006). Having the appropriate capabilities, strong relationship management
and investments, a corporate wide strategy for offshoring, learning curve effects, and dynamic

Lopez, J. and Raskino, M. -- Gartner Inc. (March 4, 2010), “CEO Concerns: Peering into 2010 and Beyond” ID:
G00174004
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portfolios of control may all be attributed to success with offshoring (Carmel and Tjia, 2005;
Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity and Rottman, 2008; Manning et al.,
2008; Rottman and Lacity, 2008).
Thus, to the extent the strategic drivers of offshoring remain relevant for firms and
managers believe that they have been successful in achieving the strategic benefits through their
current offshoring efforts (while avoiding or mitigating some of the challenges of offshoring)
they are more likely to continue offshoring. As a result they are also less likely to be responsive
to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The greater the level of organizational success with offshoring, the lower the
organizational responsiveness.
In addition to this direct effect, we expect that the level of organizational success with
offshoring will strengthen the effects of those institutional factors which lower responsiveness
and at the same time weaken the effects of those factors which increase organizational
responsiveness. Institutional theorists have acknowledged that to the extent conformity to
institutional pressures is perceived to conflict with organizational goals and economic interests,
organizations will be more likely to resist such pressures (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988;
Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Such inconsistency reflects
organizational interests and strategic motives to be at odds with institutional expectations and
provokes organizational doubts about the validity or legitimacy of institutional expectations
(Oliver, 1991). That is, the likelihood that organizations will conform or resist to institutional
pressures is not exclusively dependent on the five institutional factors identified above
(Hypotheses 1 – 5) but also in interaction with the discrepancy between institutional expectations
and organizational strategic motives. We extend these arguments to not only include the strategic
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motives but more proximally, the outcomes of the actions geared toward achievement of such
strategic goals. In other words, beyond the strategic drivers of offshoring initiatives (the subject
of counter institutional pressures), it is the outcomes of current offshoring efforts in terms of the
strategic objectives that will further determine the level of responsiveness to institutional
pressures. Given the significant challenges with offshoring (e.g., Carmel and Tjia, 2005;
Rottman and Lacity, 2006) those firms which did achieve some level of success with offshoring
will be less responsive despite the institutional pressures against offshoring. These considerations
lead to the following 5 moderation hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7a: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship
between the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity to antioffshoring institutional pressures and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less
positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring.
Hypothesis 7b: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship
between the degree of dependence on Federal and State Governments and organizational
responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low,
success with offshoring.
Hypothesis 7c: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship
between organizational plans for offshore portfolio and organizational responsiveness: the
relationship is more negative for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with
offshoring.
Hypothesis 7d: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship
between the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that executives at other firms
are curbing or eliminating offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less
positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring.
Hypothesis 7e: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the relationship
between level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State Government(s) with
respect to offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for
those who report high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring.
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6

METHOD

6.1 Data Collection Approach and Target Respondents
A web-based questionnaire survey served as the primary data collection method. The
following factors guided this choice. First, Oliver (1991) suggests that research strategies to
investigate responsiveness need to include perceptual measures of several of the proposed
variables and that field interviews or questionnaires may be used (p. 172). Second, to our
knowledge, there is currently no publicly available (or even available for purchase) archival data
pertaining to the study variables. Organizations are currently not required to disclose their extent
of offshore engagements and/or the reasons behind their plans to increase/decrease their
offshoring initiatives. Given these considerations, we chose the questionnaire survey approach.
Prior research has argued and shown that macro-organizational aspects, such as the focus of this
study, are relatively less susceptible to mono-method biases compared to more microorganizational concepts such as job satisfaction, stress, and turnover intentions (Ang and
Cummings 1997; Crampton and Wagner 1994). Further, scholars have suggested that in the
absence of archival data, self-reported measures are acceptable at the organizational unit of
analysis provided data is obtained from key respondents who are directly involved with and
knowledgeable about the subject matter of interest (Chan, Huff, Copeland, and Barclay, 1997;
Dess and Robinson, 1984; Peng and Luo, 2000; Sabherwal and King, 1995).
Target respondents: As indicated above, target respondents for the questionnaire were
senior executives (King and Sabherwal, 1992) knowledgeable about the sourcing activities at
each firm. However, accurate identification of individuals with such knowledge across a random
sample of organizations proved to be challenge. For example, a recent IT sourcing related report
from Gartner Research (Karamouzis, 2011) indicates that the constituents more typically
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responsible for the planning and execution of all IT sourcing initiatives within an organization
include the CIO or those operational managers who directly report to the CIO or other senior
executives in charge of IT. Further, executives within other functions such as procurement (e.g.,
Chief Procurement Officer), legal, and in some cases respective business units are also often in
charge of sourcing.
To overcome this challenge of identifying executives knowledgeable of sourcing and in
light of difficulties in obtaining data from busy executives we drew on a unique resource that
directly provided us access to sourcing executives and professionals. Specifically, to find and
gain access to such individuals, we sought help from the research wing of Everest Group, a
reputable and fairly large advisory firm with offices in the United States, Canada, United
Kingdom, and India. Among Everest Group’s many service offerings, the firm provides research
and consulting services to buyers and providers of outsourced services and has a significant
focus on offshore or global sourcing. Its clients include Global 1000 firms from around the world
and across all industry categories18. The Managing Partner for Research was our point of contact
and championed our research efforts and access to Everest Group’s database of sourcing
executives.
The research firm’s database comprised of names and email addresses of over 10,000
subscribers who draw on this firm’s active industry research output and a variety of webinar
style presentations related to global sourcing of business services. The research firm agreed to
help us collect data from these subscribers. The subscribers represented mostly large
organizations from across the world currently engaged in substantial offshore arrangements both

18

Everest Group Website, About Us section: available online at http://www.everestgrp.com/about-us/. Accessed on
February 24, 2012.
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via captive and third-party supplier models. The subscribers were at various levels within these
organizations, ranging from C-level executives to project managers. This was an ideal pool of
potential respondents for study purposes, access to which was otherwise very difficult. Thus, we
capitalized on this excellent resource and sought to target the subscribers in Everest Group’s
mailing list. We did so while fully realizing the tradeoff of not having a traditional random
sample of organizations.

6.2 Instrument Refinement and Data Collection
Instrument refinement: We took the following steps to ensure that the measures were
reliable and valid during the design stage (steps carried out in the analysis stage are outlined
below). First, we drew on established measures with demonstrated reliability and validity when
possible. Second, the instrument was reviewed by two dissertation committee members with
knowledge of broader offshoring research and practice. Each member was requested to carry an
in-depth assessment of the measures given the study purposes. They were requested to
specifically review the initial draft instrument to identify questions that are ambiguous, vague, or
sources of possible bias (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). We iteratively incorporated any
suggested changes and refinements. The changes pertained to re-wording of certain items,
shortening of items, and elimination of redundant items to shorten the overall survey length.
Third, we pre-tested the refined instrument with three executives. Two of these were former
senior level IT executives at large organizations in the aerospace and financial services
industries. The third executive had extensive experience with global sourcing throughout his
career and is currently considered a leading outsourcing expert/consultant. We asked the
executives to read the questionnaire carefully and to assess meaningfulness, relevance, and
clarity of its items (King and Sabherwal, 1992). Again, changes were incorporated iteratively
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(Chan et al., 1997). The changes from executives pertained to wording changes in the
instructions page of questionnaire and clarification/shortening of instructions for certain
questions.
Fourth, representatives of the Everest Group went through the survey draft and suggested
many changes to better fit the industry vernacular and the current offshoring environment. The
managing partner of research, one vice-president of research, and two research analysts,
carefully read the survey multiple times. We incorporated their suggestions related to survey
length and wording for survey and question instructions iteratively. The survey length was
reduced by approximately 40%. All these pre-test respondents reported a survey completion time
between 15 to 20 minutes.
Survey administration: The refined questionnaire was administered via the web using
SurveyMonkey™, an online survey creation and data collection tool. The survey contained an
introductory cover page and the second page consisted of definitions of important terms such as
offshoring, captive centers, third-party suppliers etc. The third page contained a screening
question aimed to filter out service-provider, consulting, and other types of firms as the study
purpose was to assess responsiveness of client organizations. Only those respondents
representing a client organization were allowed to move further. All others were redirected out of
the client survey. The last page of survey had a section where respondents could provide their
contact information so that a copy of the summarized survey results could be sent to them.
Data collection occurred between September and November, 2011. In the first wave of
data collection, the research firm sent emails with a link to online survey to about half the
subscribers. Three reminder emails were sent to this set one week apart from each other. This
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resulted in 44 responses. The research firm then sent emails to the second half of their
subscribers list. A reminder email, one week later, was also sent to this second list. The number
of responses received from the second set of emails was 18. To increase the number of
responses, we sent individual emails to approximately 550 subscribers. This personal outreach
resulted in another 38 responses. Finally, we contacted approximately 30 executives at local
firms within our region requesting participation. This effort resulted in another 10 responses. We
checked for any significant differences among respondents based on these four different modes
of contact as described in the next sub-section.
Thus, a total of 110 people responded to the survey invitation. Out of these 7 were
representatives of service-provider firms, 9 belonged to consulting firms, and 7 did not specify
their firm type. All such non-client respondents were discarded and 87 client organizations
related responses were retained. Additionally, three client responses were overwhelmingly blank
and had to be removed. All this resulted in a final set of 84 client organizations (buyers of
offshore services--either through third-party service providers or own captives) which was used
in analyses.
Checks for biases among the set of respondents: Given that the final set of 84 respondents
were obtained from four different modes of contact (two separate mass emails and two separate
personal outreach efforts) as described above, we compared these four groups using Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) with respect to two variables. ANOVA tests for Total Firm Revenue, F (3,
75) =.90, p > .05, and for Total Number of Employees F (3, 79) =.69, p > .05 both indicated that
there were no significant differences between the four groups on these variables. Thus, we
combined all sets of respondents.
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We compared early versus late respondents to approximate any differences between
respondents and non-respondents. Following King and Sabherwal (1992) we compared the first
1/3 with the last 1/3 of the respondents and discarded the middle 1/3 to ensure a clean separation
between early and late respondents. ANOVA tests for Total Firm Revenue, F (1, 53) = 1.68, p
>.05 and for Total Number of Employees, F (1, 55) = 2.13, p >.05, both indicated that there were
no significant differences between early and late respondents. We also compared 40 of the
known firms in this study (i.e. those firms whose names could be identified based on respondent
information) with a sampling frame representative of the broader population of firms likely to
engage in offshoring. Specifically, we compared the 40 known firms with the Fortune Global
500, year 2011 list of companies19. Independent samples t-test in terms of 2011 Revenues
suggested no significant difference t (538) = 1.176, p=.240. Additionally, we compared the 40
known firms with the remaining 44 firms in our study, on all the study variables. ANOVA tests
revealed no significant differences.
Sample Characteristics: Table 1 provides demographic characteristics of firms in the
sample. Overall, 49 out of 84 respondents (58.3%) provided a contact email for receiving a copy
of survey results. 65% of firms had revenues of $5 billion or greater and 25.3% had revenues in
excess of $40 billion. 79.6% had more than 5000 total employees and 24.1% had more than
100,000 employees. The firms operate in a diverse range of industries. 27.9% percent of firms
belonged to banking, financial services, and insurance sectors. Healthcare and Manufacturing
firms had slightly greater than 10% representation each and 8.8% of firms belonged to the
electronics and hi-tech sectors. There were no public sector or transportation related firms. The
firms had their headquarters (home country) located in a total of nine different countries. About
19

Fortune Magazine, Global 500 List, Year 2011, Available online at:
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/. Retrieved March 22, 2012.
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70% of these were United States based firms and 10.7% were based out of the United Kingdom.
A majority of firms utilized third-party services providers for offshore services.
TABLE 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
REVENUES
Category
Lower than US$250 million
US$250 million - 1 billion
US$1 billion - 5 billion
US$5 billion - 10 billion
US$10 billion - 20 billion
US$20 billion - 30 billion
US$30 billion - 40 billion
Greater than US$40 billion
Total

%
6.3
5.1
22.8
16.5
10.1
8.9
5.1
25.3
100%

Number of Employees
Category
0 to 2,499 Employees
2,500 to 4,999
5,000 to 19,999
20,000 to 49,999
50,000 to 100,000
More than 100,000 Employees
Total

%
12
8.4
21.7
20.5
13.3
24.1
100%

Firms’ Headquarter Countries
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total

%
1.2
3.6
4.8
3.6
1.2
2.4
2.4
10.7
70.2
100%

Industry
Category
%
Aerospace and Defense
5.9
BFSI: Banking, Financial Services and Insurance
27.9
Consumer Packaged Goods
7.4
Electronics & Hi-Tech
8.8
Energy & Utilities
4.4
Healthcare
10.3
Manufacturing & Industrials
10.3
Media & Entertainment
2.9
Professional services/Investment
5.9
Public Sector (Government, Education, Not-for-profit etc.)
0.0
Retail
2.9
Telecom
4.4
Transportation
0.0
Others
7.1
Total
100%
Information
Business
Dominant offshore models
Technology a Processes a
Use Predominantly Captive
18.4%
18.9%
Centers
Use Predominantly Third-party
65.8%
44.6%
Service Providers
Use Similar Mix Across Captive /
13.2%
16.2%
Third Party
a
Percentages don’t add up to 100%
Types of Third-party Service Providers a Used

%b

Use Large Global Service Providers

42.9%

Use Large Offshore Centric Service Providers

70.2%

Use Smaller Offshore Service Providers
a
See note below for explanation of these terms
b
Percentages don’t add up to 100% due to overlap

22.6%

n = 84
Global Service Providers: Also typically grouped as “Global Majors” are service providers which primarily
originated in the US or Europe, and have since spread their operations to additional onshore and offshore countries.
Such providers typically have less than 50-60% of their total headcount based in offshore locations. Examples:
Accenture, ACS, Atos, Capgemini, Convergys, CSC, Dell Services (now includes Perot), AON/Hewitt, HP
(Enterprise Services), IBM (Global Services), Unisys, and possibly others.
Offshore-centric Service Providers: Also sometimes referred to as "Indian Heritage Service Providers” or
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“Offshore Majors”; these providers started their operations in India, gradually built scale, and then expanded to
other offshore and onshore locations beyond India. They typically have >70% of their headcount based in offshore
locations, mainly India. Examples: Cognizant, EXL, Genpact, HCL Tech, Infosys, Mahindra/Satyam, Tata
Consultancy Services (TCS), Wipro, WNS, and possibly others.
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6.3 Measures
Appendix 1 summarizes the measures and questionnaire items for all study variables.
Dependent Variable
Organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures (Organizational
Responsiveness): The dependent variable in this study is geared toward capturing organizational
responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures within the context of organizations’ IT
and BP offshoring initiatives. Given this purpose, our attempt was to assess whether
organizations were heeding to calls for a reduction in overall offshoring and doing so specifically
as a result of broader anti-offshoring pressures. Due to a lack of archival data we included direct
questions that assess the degree to which organizational actions depict such responsiveness
(please see Appendix 1). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with
four statements with respect to their organization’s responses to anti-offshoring pressures. All of
these statements were anchored on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree.” Items assessed overall responsiveness,
responsiveness in terms of IT offshoring and BP offshoring, and overall moves toward avoiding
new offshoring contracts. For example, “[I]n response to anti-offshoring pressures, our
organization has reduced or plans to reduce the overall extent of offshore delivery.” After
subjecting these items to factor analyses and assessing their reliability we formed an index of
these four items by taking their arithmetic mean to represent the construct organizational
responsiveness (Cronbach’s α=.874).
Independent and Moderator Variables
Expectations of Increase in Social legitimacy: This variable was assessed by a direct
question based on Oliver’s (1991) suggestions that senior managers may be asked about
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“whether they expect compliance to increase their organization’s status or prestige (p. 172).” An
item referring to the organizational expectations of increase in image as a socially responsible
organization and organizational prestige was included—“We expect that our image as a socially
responsible organization will be enhanced if we lower our overall extent of offshoring.” The item
was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and
7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater expectations that lowering the
extent of offshoring will enhance the organization’s social legitimacy.
Dependence on Federal and State Governments: In creating this measure, we followed a
traditional approach used in the corporate political activity literature (Hillman et al., 2004) that
focuses on the percentage of revenues coming from governments as an indicator of a focal
organization’s dependence on government. The item assessed dependence on sales from Federal
and State Governments – “A fairly significant portion of our organization’s total sales
(revenues) comes from Federal and/or State Government(s) as customers.” The item was
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7
indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater dependence on government.
Organizational plans for offshore portfolio: Toward the beginning of the survey,
respondents were asked to indicate the size of their organization’s current offshoring portfolio
(approximate offshore headcount in terms of Full-time Equivalent (FTE) workers). Following
this respondents were asked of how their overall offshoring portfolio was going to change in the
next three years. Response categories ranged from “Decrease by more than 2500 FTE” to “No
Change” to “Increase by more than 2500 FTE”. Using this data, we created a dummy variable as
follows. Those who indicated plans to increase the offshore head-count were coded as “1” and
those who indicated no change or a decrease in offshore head-count were coded as “0”.
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Complying actions of other firms: This variable was assessed in a manner similar to the
dependent variable except that the referents for these actions were executives at other firms in
the network of the focal firm’s executive – “I know of executives at other firms who have
responded to anti-offshoring pressures by reducing or planning to reduce the overall extent of
offshore delivery.” The item was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1
indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater
responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures by executives at other firms in the focal
executive’s network.
Regulatory environment uncertainty with respect to offshoring: The conceptualization of
environmental uncertainty in this variable is similar to what Milliken (1987) termed ‘State
Uncertainty.’ It captures the extent to which organizational actors “perceive the organizational
environment or a particular component of that environment, to be unpredictable (p. 136).” Thus,
with the focus on unpredictability and a desire to consider uncertainty in relation to the Federal
and state regulatory environment, we drew on the Miles and Snow (1978) perceived
environmental uncertainty scale as the building block. This scale has been extensively used and
has demonstrated good measurement properties (e.g., Buchko, 1994). The scale requires
respondents to rate the specific characteristics or behaviors pertaining to environmental
components such as suppliers and government regulatory bodies, in terms of their predictability.
The anchors include 1: Highly Predictable and 7: Highly Unpredictable. We adapted the items to
reflect the offshoring context, and focused on the regulatory environment. This resulted in the
measure containing a total of 5 items pertaining to Federal and State Government(s) Regulatory
Actions related to offshoring. The items capture, the degree of predictability of changes in
overall tax laws or agency policies, data privacy/security laws, intellectual property protection
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laws, hiring of foreign workers, and conditions surrounding fulfillment of state and federal
contracts. Higher ratings indicate greater uncertainty. One item related to intellectual property
protection was dropped during factor analyses. A composite based on the mean of the other four
items was used to represent regulatory environment uncertainty (Cronbach’s α=.809).
Success with Offshoring: In the interest of gauging overall success with offshoring as
opposed to specific offshoring transactions, we drew on the Grover, Cheon, and Teng (1996) IT
outsourcing success measure and other studies (e.g., Ross and Beath, 2006; Slaughter and Ang,
1996; Winkler, Dibbern, and Heinzl, 2008) to create a six item overall measure of offshoring
success. The approach was consistent with Grover et al. (1996) in that the items were geared
toward assessing satisfaction with offshoring. Items covered aspects such as cost reduction,
increased access to skilled personnel, improvements in overall flexibility, and increased speed to
market or speed of delivery. Two items assessing overall satisfaction were also included (Grover
et al., 1996). The items were assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates
“Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. After subjecting these items to factor
analyses, we created an index as the average of these six items to represent success with
offshoring. Higher values indicate greater success with offshoring (Cronbach’s α=.872).
Control Variables
US Firms vs. others: While some industry reports indicate that the US is the largest
market for offshoring and that US firms are likely to lead the increase in demand for offshoring
services in the coming years (Iyengar, 2011a), other reports indicate that there is a slow but
noticeable trend among US and Canadian firms to shy away from offshore engagements
(Reynolds, 2011). To control for such possible effects we included a dummy variable related to
whether a firm’s headquarters were within the US or outside of US. Respondents were requested
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to answer the questionnaire with respect to offshoring from their organization’s headquarters
(home) country. Respondents selected their home country from a list toward the beginning of
survey. Organizations with their home country of United States were coded as “1” and all others
were coded as “0.”
Captive Operations vs. others: The nature of offshore engagement may also have an
impact on the level of responsiveness to institutional pressures against offshoring. Prior research
indicates that firms often engage in captive offshoring arrangements where they opt for internal
control of offshore operations (captive offshoring) as opposed to or in conjunction with engaging
offshore suppliers (Lewin et al. 2009). Captive arrangements involve greater investments of
financial and other resources and are typically carried out by larger technology intensive firms
(Carmel and Agarwal 2002). Although captive arrangements may be a stronger target for
institutional pressures, they may be more difficult for firms to disentangle. On the other hand,
captive facilities bring high risks such as of attrition of human assets which are highly mobile
(Lewin et al. 2009; Manning et al. 2008). Respondents were asked to indicate the dominant
model for their organization’s offshore engagement. The response categories included 1)
Predominantly Captive, 2) Predominantly Third-party Providers, 3) Similar Mix Across Captive
/ Third Party. Those who indicated either predominantly captive or some mix of captive and third
party were coded as “1” having considerable captive operations and the rest were coded as “0”.
Senior Most Respondents vs. others: Despite strong efforts to restrict responses to only
senior executives, our lack of control in selecting potential respondents and the nature of this
sample required that other respondents be included. Such respondents, although directly involved
in the day-to-day operations may not be necessarily attuned to strategic overtones within an
organization. Senior level respondents may be more aware of larger institutional shifts and their
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strategic implications for their organizations (Sutcliffe, 1994). To control for this possible effect,
we dummy coded respondents as senior most or not. Respondents indicating their job titles to be
either at the Chief Executive level (various functions) or one level below it were coded as “1”
senior level respondents and the rest were coded as “0”, not senior level.
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures: We controlled for organizations’ internal pressures to
reduce costs as cost reduction has repeatedly been cited as the top reasons organizations choose
offshoring (Dibbern et al., 2004; Lacity et al., 2010). Such pressures could explain organizational
responsiveness and may very well counteract any effects from institutional factors. This variable
was measured with the item “Overall, there are pressures from within our organization to
reduce costs for Information Technology (IT) and/or Business Process (BP) related services.”
The item was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly
Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree”. Higher ratings indicate greater pressures from
within the organization to reduce costs for IT and BP related services.
Imposed Offshoring Restrictions: Institutional control describes the means by which
pressures are imposed on organizations and one such set of means relate to legal or government
mandates and a range of coercive pressures directed at organizations (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1991). While, arguably, much may be going on in the institutional
spheres with respect to offshoring, organizations may not directly feel the pressures to stop
offshoring. On the other hand, those facing directly imposed restrictions on offshoring may be
more responsive given government or legal mandate. To control for this important variable
which may affect the degree of organizational responsiveness, we drew on Section 2 to measure
directly imposed offshoring restrictions on organizations coming from four sets of constituents.
Four items covered restrictions against offshoring imposed by Federal and/or State governments,
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customers, legal and contractual obligations, and employees/unions. For example, “Our
organization faces customer imposed restrictions on offshoring.” Two additional items covering
overall imposed restrictions on IT and BP offshoring were also included. The items were
assessed on a 7-point Likert-type response scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7
indicates “Strongly Agree”. Two items were dropped during factor analysis. A composite based
on the mean of remaining four items was used as an indicator for imposed restrictions on
offshoring. Higher ratings indicate greater imposed restrictions on offshoring (Cronbach’s
α=.882).

6.4 Data Analyses
Moderated Hierarchical Multiple Regression analyses were carried out to test the
hypotheses. Prior to proceeding with hypotheses testing, we assessed the construct validity of all
multi-item constructs and checked if the data conform to other important assumptions of
Multiple Regression. We discuss these below.
Along with the steps taken during instrument development and refinement discussed
above we took the following steps to further assess construct validity of the four multi-item
constructs Organizational Responsiveness, Offshoring Success, Regulatory Environment
Uncertainty, and Imposed Offshoring Restrictions. First, we performed Principal Component
Analysis using Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization to ensure convergent and
discriminant validity among the constructs (Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen, 2004). Principal
Component Analysis requires that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
(MSA) be greater than .50 for each individual item as well as for the overall set of items (Hair et
al., 2006). The MSA for two items related to Imposed Offshoring Restrictions was below this
threshold. These items were dropped in the first iteration. Further, one additional item related to
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TABLE 2
Factor Loadings and Cronbach’s Alphas for Multi-item Constructs
Success with
Offshoring
.657
.785
.832
.791
.755
.689

Imposed
Offshoring
Restrictions
.041
.140
.032
.116
-.022
-.198

Organizational
Responsiveness
.071
-.003
-.121
.072
-.120
-.129

Regulatory
Environment
Uncertainty
.081
-.082
.068
-.112
-.252
.019

RSTRCT2
RSTRCT3
RSTRCT5
RSTRCT6

.032
.038
-.039
.082

.670
.871
.841
.864

.033
.154
.156
.143

.183
.020
.142
.096

RESP1
RESP2
RESP3
RESP4

-.054
.009
.099
-.290

.230
-.003
.127
.178

.785
.900
.895
.691

.158
-.085
.086
-.083

UNCT1
UNCT2
UNCT4
UNCT5
Cronbach’s Alphas

-.103
-.007
-.155
.107
.872

.193
.059
-.011
.235
.882

.090
.092
-.105
-.011
.874

.794
.793
.732
.787
.809

Items

a

OS1
OS2
OS3
OS4
OS5
OS6

Extraction /Rotation Method: Principal Component Analysis / Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
a

: Appendix 1 provides the items as used in survey
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Regulatory Environment Uncertainty was cross-loading on two factors. This item was also
removed. For the final iteration, the MSA for all items was greater than .50 supporting their
retention in the analysis. Further, the overall MSA for the set of items included in the analysis
was .71, which exceeds the suggested threshold of .60 for overall MSA (Garson, 2011). The
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was also significant (p < 0.001). Communalities for all items
exceeded the recommended threshold of .50 indicating that the constructs explain greater than
50% variation in respective items (Hair et al., 2006). Overall, the Principal Component Analysis
showed four factors, as desired, with Eigen-values greater than 1. The four factors together
explained 66.52% of the variance. All items loaded cleanly on their respective constructs and
there were no further high cross loadings. The lowest loading was .657 which is well above the
recommended minimum of .40 (Hair et al., 2006). Table 2 provides the factor loadings
highlighted in bold for the designated constructs.
We also assessed construct reliability. Cronbach’s Alphas for each of the four multi-item
constructs, Responsiveness (α = .87), Imposed Offshoring Restrictions (α = .88), Offshoring
Success (α = .87), and Regulatory Environment Uncertainty (α = .81) were well above the
recommended .70 threshold (Nunnally, 1978) thus indicating good internal consistency amongst
respective items representing each construct (Garson, 2011). Overall, these analyses suggest that
lack of construct validity is not a threat to this study’s results.
To check for potential outliers and their influence, we first checked the standardized
residuals for all cases to ensure they were below the recommended value of 3.3 (corresponding
to the .001 alpha level) (Garson, 2011). Examination of standardized residuals revealed that all
values were below 2.0 indicating no potential outliers. We also examined the standardized
DfBetas for all predictors across all cases. Standardized DfBetas measure the change in b

Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 65

coefficients of respective predictors, measured in standard errors, if a potential case were to be
dropped from analyses. All standardized DfBetas were below the recommended cutoff of 2
divided by square root of sample size (Garson 2011).
To check whether error terms were normally distributed, we examined the histogram and
the Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals (Garson, 2011). Both indicated that the
error terms conformed to a normal distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (.068, p>.20) and
Shapiro-Wilk (.985, p=.46) tests were both not significant indicating no severe departures from
normality. To ensure that Heteroscedasticity was not a problem, we plotted the standardized
regression residuals by the predicted values in a scatter-plot. Examination of the scatter-plot
revealed a “random cloud of dots” and no consistent pattern--as desired (Garson, 2011). In terms
of non-linearity, Garson (2011) indicates that this is in general not a problem if the standard
deviation of the dependent variable is greater than the standard deviation of the residuals. The
standard deviation on the dependent variable (1.28) in our analyses was greater than the standard
deviation of the residuals (.78) indicating that non-linearity was not a threat. We also examined
all partial regression plots and found no significant departures from linearity. The residual plot
explained above in relation to Heteroscedasticity was also in line with the partial regression
plots.
Multicollinearity or the excessive inter-correlation of independent variables can be a
serious threat for regression analyses (Aiken and West, 1991). High correlations increase the
standard error of the beta coefficients and may mask the unique role of some or all independent
variables (Garson, 2011). To minimize this potential problem in relation to the interaction terms
and their main effect variables, we standardized all independent variables (including control
variables but excluding dichotomous variables) prior to creating the cross-product interaction
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terms (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson and Richter, 2006). To assess this threat after running the
regressions, we examined the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all variables.
All tolerance values were well above the more stringent recommended minimum of .2 and all
VIF values were well below the recommended maximum of 4.0 (Garson, 2011). The lowest
Tolerance and highest VIF values were .273 and 3.664 respectively and belonged to a crossproduct interaction term involving a dichotomous independent variable. Further, all Condition
Index scores were well below the cut-off value of 30 and also below the desired cut-off of 15.
All these indicate that multicollinearity was not a threat for these analyses (Fox, 1997;
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
In order to minimize the threat of possible common method variance, we took some steps
recommended by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003). First, as noted above,
reliability and validity of the measures were assessed before proceeding to hypotheses testing.
The principal component analysis, using the study variables, indicates that none of the items
cross-loaded on unintended constructs and highest cross loading was only .29 (Table 2). This
suggests that common method variance was not strong enough to confound measurement of
study constructs (Julian et al., 2008). Second, in order to ease the respondents’ concern of
leaking critical business information, they were assured that the survey is completely anonymous
and only summarized results will be reported. Third, to provide a reference of the degree of
common method variance in the study, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test by entering all
Likert-type items collected from the questionnaire into one principal components analysis. This
obtained a solution with 18 factors with Eigen-values greater than 1 accounting for 80% of the
variance. The first factor accounted for only 7.4% of the total variance which is less than onetenth of the total variance. Given no single factor accounted for the majority of the covariance
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we had grounds for assuming that common method variance is not responsible for the study
results.
Hypotheses test
As indicated earlier, we used moderated hierarchical linear regressions with ordinary
least squares method to test hypotheses. We first entered the five control variables to provide a
baseline model (Model 1). We next entered the five (H1 to H5) independent variables in Model
2, followed by the moderator variable (H6) in Model 3. Models 4 to 8 incorporate the five
interaction terms between the five independent variables and the moderator. As explained above,
all variables were standardized prior to multiplying them to create interaction terms. This was to
reduce the potential problem of multi-collinearity between interaction terms and their respective
main effect variables (Dawson and Richter, 2006).
We assessed Hypotheses 1 to 5 based on the significance of b coefficients of the respective
variables after confirming the overall significance of model 2. We assessed Hypothesis 6 based
on the significance of the b coefficient in model 3 as well as the change in R2 between models 2
and 3. Hypotheses 7a to 7e were assessed based on models 4 to 8 respectively. Significance of
each of the interaction terms with the hypothesized signs and a significant change in R2 upon
adding the interaction term was used to determine support for the respective interaction
hypotheses. IBM SPSS Statistics version 19 was used for all analyses. To facilitate interpretation
of the significant interactions, we plotted the significant interactions at high and low levels of the
moderator variable using values one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken and
West, 1991; Dawson and Richter, 2006).
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6.5 Results
Table 3 provides Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations at the measure level
for all variables in the analyses. Table 4 provides the regression analyses results for
organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional pressures. Table 5 summarizes the
results of hypotheses testing.
Hypothesis 1 stated that the greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable
from conformity, the greater the organizational responsiveness. As Model 2 in Table 4 indicates,
the effect of social legitimacy on responsiveness is significant and positive (β = .36, p < .001)
suggesting that organizational expectations for an enhancement in their image as a socially
responsible organization are likely to result in their willingness to reduce the overall extent of
offshoring. Hypothesis 1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2 stated that greater dependence on governments would lead to organizations
being more responsive. The coefficient for dependence in Model 2 is not significant (β = -.09, p
> .05). Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 suggested that the greater the consistency of institutional pressures with
organizational goals the greater the responsiveness. Model 2 indicates that the effect of
organizational plans to increase offshoring was negative and significant (β = -.20, p < .05)
suggesting that those organizations with goals to increase their offshore headcounts in the next
three years showed lower levels of responsiveness as compared to those whose goals included
lowering or maintaining their offshore headcounts. Hypothesis 3 was supported.
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TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations (s.d.), and Correlations
Variable

1. US Firm or Not
2. Captive Operations or Not
3. Senior Most Respondents or Not
4. Internal Cost Reduction Pressures
5. Imposed Offshoring Restrictions
6. Social Legitimacy
7. Dependence on Government
8. Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio
9. Complying Actions of Other Firms
10. Regulatory Environment Uncertainty
11. Success with Offshoring
12. Responsiveness
* p < .05
** p < .01
Two-tailed tests

Mean
.70
.29
.59
6.05
3.27
3.53
3.28
.73
3.64
4.51
5.11
2.87

s.d.
.46
.45
.49
1.34
1.49
1.51
1.93
.14
1.71
1.09
1.05
1.21

1

2

3

4

-.17
.15
.02
-.06
-.05
.05
.15
-.02
-.09
.04
-.13

-.22
.03
.07
.02
.06
.20
.04
-.12
.15
-.18

-.02
.01
-.12
.08
.19
.03
.28*
.01
.12

.07
.02
-.05
-.16
.02
-.01
.03
.15

5

6

7

.47**
.43** .29*
.03 -.12
.30*
.33*
.18
.20
.06 -.24
.27*
.47**

-.07
.33*
.08
.08
.15

8

9

10

11

-.24
-.06
.28*
.14 -.15
-.34** .50**

-.05
.04

-.06
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TABLE 4
Results of Moderated Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Organizational Responsiveness
Independent Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
US Firms vs. others
Captive Operations vs. others
Senior Most Respondents vs. others
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures
Imposed Offshoring Restrictions

-.17
-.20
.09
.13
.23*

Social Legitimacy
Dependence on Government
Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio
Complying Actions of Other Firms
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty
Success with Offshoring

3.19
.14
.09
.14
2.52*
2.52*

Standardized regression coefficients are reported. n = 84.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Model 8

-.16
-.17
.22*
.10
.07

-.17
-.19*
.23*
.09
.05

-.18*
-.20*
.24**
.09
.01

-.18*
-.20*
.25**
.06
.03

-.18*
-.19*
.26**
.06
.04

-.18*
-.20*
.26**
.05
.05

-.22*
-.21*
.24**
.08
.09

.36***
-.09
-.20*
.39***
-.24*

.39***
-.10
-.21*
.40***
-.24*
.13

.43***
-.07
-.24**
.42***
-.23*
.15

.39***
-.10
-.23*
.48***
-.25**
.16

.39***
-.11
-.24**
.48***
-.25**
.24

.38***
-.13
-.25**
.49***
-.26**
.25

.37***
-.12
-.22*
.49***
-.28**
.19

-.20*

-.22*
.17

-.22*
.16
-.10

-.21*
.19
-.11
-.05

-.20*
.21
-.08
.01
-.19*

3.44
.53
.45
.03
6.72***
5.16*

3.39
.55
.47
.02
6.68***
3.44

3.41
.56
.47
.00
6.18***
.44

3.41
.56
.46
.00
5.72***
.20

3.45
.58
.48
.03
5.86***
4.10*

Social Legitimacy X Success
Dependence on Govt. X Success
Org. Plans for Offshore Portfolio X Success
Complying Actions of Other Firms X Success
Regulatory Env. Uncertainty X Success
Intercept
R2
Adjusted R2
R2Change (ΔR2)
Model F
F Change

Model 7

3.38
.48
.41
.35
6.85***
9.76***

3.41
.50
.42
.01
6.49***
1.98
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Hypothesis 4 stated that the greater the extent to which managers at a focal firm believe that
executives at other firms are lowering their offshore engagements, the greater will be their
responsiveness. Model 2 shows that the effect of complying actions of other firms is significant
and positive (β = .39, p < .001). Hypothesis 4 was supported.
Hypothesis 5 stated that the greater the level of regulatory environment uncertainty the
greater will be organization responsiveness. The coefficient for regulatory environment
uncertainty in Model 2 is significant but the sign is negative (β = -.24, p < .05) as opposed to the
hypothesized positive effect. This indicates that organizations are instead less responsive when
the executives perceive greater levels of uncertainty in regulations pertaining to the future of
offshoring. Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Hypothesis 6 stated that the greater the level of organizational success with IT offshoring,
the lower the organizational responsiveness. As Model 3 indicates, upon entering the success
with offshoring term, there was no significant increase in R2 from Model 2 to 3 (ΔR2 = .01; F
Change = 1.98, p > .05). The coefficient for success with offshoring in Model 3 was not
significant (β = .13, p > .05). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported.
Hypotheses 7a to 7b were in relation to the moderating impact of success with offshoring on
the five relationships under Hypotheses 1 to 5. Hypothesis 7a stated that success with offshoring
will moderate the positive relationship between social legitimacy and organizational
responsiveness such that the relationship will be less positive for those with high success with
offshoring as opposed to those with low success with offshoring. Model 4 indicates that the
interaction term between social legitimacy and success with offshoring is negative and
significant (β = -.20, p < .05) as hypothesized. Further, upon entering this interaction term the

Khan, Shaji, 2012, UMSL, p. 72

change in R2 from Model 3 to Model 4 was significant (ΔR2 = .03; F Change = 5.16, p < .05).
The significant coefficient with the appropriate sign and significant change in R2 indicate support
for Hypothesis 7a. To further explore the nature of this interaction, we plotted it at high and low
levels of the moderator variable using values one standard deviation above and below the mean
(Aiken and West, 1991). Figure 2a clearly shows that the otherwise strongly positive slope for
the effect of social legitimacy on responsiveness becomes less positive when success with
offshoring is high. Together, these results provided strong support for Hypothesis 7a.
Hypothesis 7b stated that success with offshoring will interact with dependence on
government such that it will make the otherwise positive relationship, less positive. As Model 5
indicates, the coefficient for the interaction between dependence on government and success
with offshoring is not significant (β = .17, p > .05). Further the change in R2 from Model 4 to 5
was also not significant (ΔR2 = .02; F Change = 3.44, p > .05). Hypothesis 7b was not supported.
Hypothesis 7c stated that success with offshoring will moderate the relationship between
organizational plans to increase offshore headcounts and responsiveness such that it will make
the negative relationship more negative when success with offshoring is high. Model 6 indicates
that the coefficient for the interaction between organizational plans and success with offshoring
is negative but not significant (β = -.10, p > .05). The change in R-square from Model 5 to 6 was
also not significant (ΔR2 = .00; F Change = .44, p > .05). Hypothesis 7c was not supported.
Hypothesis 7d suggested that the positive relationship between complying actions of other
firms and responsiveness will be weakened when success with offshoring is high. As Model 7
indicates, the coefficient for the interaction between complying actions of other firms and
success with offshoring is negative but not significant (β = -.05, p > .05). The change in R-square
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from Model 6 to 7 was also not significant (ΔR2 = .00; F Change = .20, p > .05). Hypothesis 7d
was not supported.
Hypothesis 7e stated that success with offshoring will moderate the relationship between
regulatory environment uncertainty and responsiveness such that the relationship will be less
positive when success is high as opposed to when it is low. Model 8 indicates that the coefficient
for the interaction between regulatory environment uncertainty and responsiveness is negative
and significant (β = -.19, p < .05) as hypothesized. Further, the change in R-square from Model 7
to 8 was also significant (ΔR2 = .03; F Change = 4.10, p < .05) indicating support for Hypothesis
7e. To further explore this significant interaction, we plotted it using one standard deviation
above and below the mean of the moderator variable (Aiken and West, 1991). Figure 2b shows
that the slope of regulatory environment uncertainty becomes more negative when success with
offshoring is low when compared to when success with offshoring is high. Together, these
results indicated support for Hypothesis 7e.
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FIGURE 2a
Plot of Interaction between Social Legitimacy and Offshoring Success
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FIGURE 2b
Plot of Interaction between Regulatory Environment Uncertainty and Offshoring Success
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TABLE 5
Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results
Hypothesis

Result

Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable
from conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures, the greater the organizational
responsiveness.

Supported

Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of organizational dependence on Federal and
State Governments, the greater the organizational responsiveness.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 3: Organizations that plan to increase their offshore portfolio will be less
responsive to anti-offshoring pressures than organizations that plan to maintain or
reduce their offshore portfolio.

Supported

Hypothesis 4: The greater the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe
that executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring, the greater the
organizational responsiveness.

Supported

Hypothesis 5: The lower the level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and
State Government(s) with respect to offshoring, the lower the organizational
responsiveness.

Not
Supported
(Reversed)

Hypothesis 6: The greater the level of organizational success with offshoring, the lower
the organizational responsiveness.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7a: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the
relationship between the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from
conformity to anti-offshoring institutional pressures and organizational responsiveness:
the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success
with offshoring.

Supported

Hypothesis 7b: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the
relationship between the degree of dependence on Federal and State Governments and
organizational responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report
high, as opposed to low, success with offshoring.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7c: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the
relationship between organizational plans for offshore portfolio and organizational
responsiveness: the relationship is more negative for those who report high, as opposed
to low, success with offshoring.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7d: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the
relationship between the extent to which senior managers at a focal firm believe that
executives at other firms are curbing or eliminating offshoring and organizational
responsiveness: the relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to
low, success with offshoring.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7e: The level of organizational success with offshoring moderates the
relationship between level of uncertainty in regulatory actions of Federal and State
Government(s) with respect to offshoring and organizational responsiveness: the
relationship is less positive for those who report high, as opposed to low, success with
offshoring.

Supported
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7

DISCUSSION

This study examined the impact of the nature of anti-offshoring institutional pressures on
organizational responsiveness to such pressures. The objective was to understand how firms
respond to calls for lowering or eliminating the practice of offshoring. Offshoring has been a
target of backlash from opponents who cite domestic job loss as its primary negative effect
(King, 2005; Venkatraman, 2004). Yet proponents view it as the inevitable shift in a global
economy with many positives, especially in terms of reduced costs for organizations (King,
2005; Venkatraman, 2004). Given such reported benefits, firms may not be invariably responsive
to institutional pressures and instead take their strategic considerations into account. Thus, we
modeled organization’s prior success with offshoring as an additional predictor of organizational
responsiveness and as a moderator of the influence of institutional variables.
The findings are generally consistent with fundamental explanations of organizational
responsiveness to institutional pressures that suggest that organizations do not uniformly
conform to institutional pressures but adopt varying postures depending on the nature of
institutional pressures that come to bear on them (Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1991). However, there are some surprising and some interesting results
that contribute to both the information systems literature and organization theory in general. We
discuss the findings below and describe their implications in a later section.
The finding related to social legitimacy’s strong positive effect on organizational
responsiveness lends support to a key institutional theory paradigm that organizations respond to
institutional pressures in order to maintain or garner social legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Oliver,
1991; Suchman, 1995). Expectations in increase of organizational image as socially responsible
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by reducing overall extent of offshoring were strongly and positively related to organizational
responsiveness. An interesting note with respect to the measure of social legitimacy in this study
is warranted here. The measure of expectations in increase of social legitimacy was based on
Oliver’s (1991) suggestions that executives be directly queried about such expectations. This
approach departs from traditional conceptualizations of social legitimacy in terms of
organizational size (e.g., revenues, number of employees). The argument with related to size as
an indicator of social legitimacy has been that larger organizations due to their size and visibility,
are likely to be under greater pressure to maintain their social legitimacy and hence be more
responsive (e.g., Goodstein, 1994; Julian et al., 2008). Interestingly however, neither
organizational revenues nor number of employees as indicators of size were significantly related
to responsiveness in our analyses (not reported here). Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings
seem to remain strong with respect to social legitimacy’s effects on organizational
responsiveness.
Dependence on governments, measured as percentage of revenues from government sales,
was not related to organizational responsiveness. This finding is surprising given the strong
precedence for the effects of dependence in the strategic adaptation and institutional theory
explanations of organizational responsiveness (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Oliver
(1991) suggests that greater dependence on pressuring constituents will lead organizations to be
more responsive to constituent demands. One possible reason for this non-finding could be that
governments may not be the only source of anti-offshoring pressures or perhaps a potent enough
source – and this measure doesn’t fully capture dependence on other constituents and/or the
nature of this dependence. In order to explore this further, we conducted post-hoc analyses for
this hypothesis using three alternative operationalizations of dependence. We used extent of
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government regulation for organizations, percentage of union representation in total workforce,
and number of Information Systems employees within organizations. As indicated in section 2,
unions have long argued against offshoring and are strong supporters of protectionist measures.
Given this, the higher the percentage of union represented employees the greater the dependence
and hence the greater the responsiveness. Similar logic was used for number of IS employees.
Overall, all three alternative indicators did not change the results and were all not significant.
Another explanation is that it is perhaps not dependence on such constituents that matters in this
case but the multiplicity or conflict in expectations or demands among constituents that puts
organizations in a precarious position – simple conformity in such instances is unlikely (Oliver,
1991; Pache and Santos, 2010).
With respect to organizational plans for their offshore portfolios the results suggest that
those organizations that planned on increasing their offshore footprint in the next three years
were less responsive than those organizations that planned to maintain or reduce their offshore
headcounts. This finding is consistent with institutional theory accounts that suggest that, to the
extent responsiveness to institutional pressures conflicts with organizational goals, organizations
will be more likely to resist full conformity (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Pache
and Santos, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).
The significant but negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty on organizational
responsiveness was in the opposite direction to our hypothesis. The results suggest that those
organizations whose executives perceived greater levels of regulatory environment uncertainty
with regard to offshoring were actually less responsive to institutional pressures against
offshoring. This finding runs counter to Oliver’s (1991) theorizing that suggests organizations
will adopt more responsive strategies when the environmental context of institutional influence is
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highly uncertain and unpredictable (p. 170). One possible explanation for this reverse finding is
that greater unpredictability in regulatory changes that could impact offshoring may not
immediately translate into a need for lowering the extent of offshoring. This is possibly because,
to the extent executives perceive that regulatory changes impacting offshoring are in fact
predictable, they are more likely to take them into account in their immediate decision making.
Such decisions may be, depending on what changes are perceived to be predictable, to either
increase, decrease, or maintain offshoring. When any such changes are not predictable, then
other things equal, they are likely to continue in their strategic course and adopt a posture of
buffering their organizations from such unpredictability. For example, while organizations may
choose not to lower the extent of offshoring given the unpredictability of impending regulation,
they may adopt buffering strategies such as choosing to work with service providers who can
shift from offshore delivery to onshore delivery if the need arises. This line of reasoning is
consistent with Milliken’s (1987) arguments that when the environmental context is not
predictable, organizations adopt strategies to insulate themselves from sudden, unexpected shifts
in the environment but do not commit to a particular strategic direction (p. 139). Future research
may explore both responsiveness and other types of buffering strategies simultaneously as
consequences of environmental uncertainty. Another possible explanation is that we focused
only on the regulatory aspects of environmental uncertainty as opposed to including other
aspects such as customers, competitors, suppliers, actions of labor unions, and financial markets
(e.g., Miles and Snow, 1978). Inclusion of such other aspects may have changed these results. It
is also possible that uncertainty in relation to different sectors may have different impacts on
organizational responsiveness. Finally, it is plausible that this relationship is actually curvilinear.
Overall, subject to further replication, this finding suggests that despite executives’ preference
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for stability and control in their organizations, uncertainty in regulatory environment with respect
to offshoring decreases organizational responsiveness.
One of the most interesting set of findings from this research relates to how the effects of
organizations’ prior success with offshoring come to bear on their responsiveness to antioffshoring pressures. The rationale behind inclusion of this variable was to assess how the extent
to which success with an organizational practice or arrangement which is the very issue for
institutional pressures, plays a role in organizations’ responsiveness to such pressures. The
following results shed light on this question.
The direct effect of success with offshoring (measured as satisfaction with overall offshoring
outcomes) on organizational responsiveness was non-existent. We hypothesized that greater
success with offshoring will result in lower organizational responsiveness. However, success
with offshoring had no direct effect on responsiveness and remained consistently so across all
models. Prior empirical work has shown that organizations are most responsive when
institutional pressures and organizational considerations converge. Goodstein (1994) found that
organizations were more responsive to institutional pressures for organizational involvement in
work family issues when the technical benefits from responsiveness were also greater. His study
included benefits in terms of organizational outcomes such as increased employee productivity,
morale, and retention, among others. However, such logic doesn’t seem to extrapolate well based
on current results. That is, the potential for losing out on existing benefits from offshoring did
not at least directly lower organizational responsiveness.
However, success with offshoring did attenuate the otherwise very strong positive effect of a
key institutional variable. As results related to the interaction between social legitimacy and
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offshoring success indicate, greater success with offshoring modified the positive influence of
social legitimacy expectations on organizational responsiveness. Specifically, when offshoring
success was low, social legitimacy had a strong positive relationship with organizational
responsiveness. However, when success was high, the otherwise strong positive relationship
became much weaker (see Figure 2a). This is perhaps the most interesting finding from this
study. It highlights the dynamics of institutional and resource dependence explanations behind
the motives of organizational responses to external expectations—in that, compliance to external
expectations under the institutional lens may be viewed as self-serving while non-compliance
under the resource dependence perspective may also be considered self-serving (Oliver, 1991 pp.
149-150).
This logic rests on the idea that both theories suggest organizations attempt to obtain
stability and legitimacy, both assume that organizations may be interest driven, and both
highlight the importance of obtaining legitimacy for purposes of demonstrating social worthiness
and garnering resources (DiMaggio, 1988; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Greenwood and Hinings,
1996; Oliver, 1991; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Under such logic
then, Oliver (1991) suggests that the advantages of compliance from an institutional perspective
include increased prestige and social legitimacy among others. On the other hand the advantages
of non-compliance from a resource dependence perspective include the ability to maintain
discretion or autonomy over internal processes and the flexibility to permit continual adaptation
vis-à-vis the task environment. The results pertaining to the non-existent direct effect of
offshoring success and the significant interaction effect with social legitimacy indicate that while
strategic considerations do not blatantly result in non-responsiveness they do come into play in a
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much more subtle manner. Next, we discuss the implications of the study results for research and
practice.

8

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Recent developments in the outsourcing literature have highlighted the importance of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability for both buyers and service providers of
global outsourcing (e.g., Babin and Nicholson, 2009; Brown, 2008). Ideas relating to CSR in a
global outsourcing context range from philanthropy, to compliance with global standards, to
collaborative efforts between clients and service providers to create social value (Babin, Briggs,
and Nicholson, 2011). Such an approach is consistent with past focus on the implications of CSR
in manufacturing and procurement in general (Drumwright, 1994) and essentially addresses what
Basu and Pallazo (2008) term as the span of organizational commitment to CSR. While such
focus is certainly valuable and worthy of attention, one contribution of this study lies in its
suggestion that the implications of social responsibility may extend to the very notion of
offshoring to begin with. In other words, while socially responsible offshoring is certainly
worthy of further research (e.g., buyer requirements for offshore providers to provide CSR
capabilities: Babin et al. 2011), considering the implications of CSR on the very business
decision of offshoring is also relevant. For example, in terms of the extent to which an
organization’s commitment to CSR manifests itself across various types of organizational
activities, do business decisions such as outsourcing take into account the firm’s professed CSR
approach, or are made without such considerations. Are firms with certain characteristics more
likely to expend greater effort in stakeholder consultation prior to an offshoring decision (Basu
and Palazzo, 2008)?
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In a similar vein, the focus of extant IT and BP outsourcing literatures on the impacts of
firm, transaction, relational, and governance characteristics on offshoring decisions is well
documented (Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity et al., 2011). However, this study highlights the utility of
incorporating both institutional and strategic explanations for offshoring. While institutional
theory has been widely incorporated in the IS literature (e.g., Mignerat and Rivard, 2009), and to
a certain extent for IT outsourcing (e.g., Ang and Cummings, 1997), its explicit consideration for
offshoring had been relatively overlooked. In doing so, it addresses the call for consideration of
the broader anti-offshoring sentiment in relation to offshoring (Lacity et al., 2010; Lacity et al.,
2011). For instance, a recent industry report by research firm Technology Partners International
claims a noticeable trend among US and Canadian firms to repatriate once offshored jobs and a
growing preference to keep outsourced work within their countries (Reynolds, 2011). Better
understanding and explanation of such trends may require research consideration of both
organizational and transaction specific factors as well as external institutional and task
environment constraints.
This study also has implications for the broader institutional theory applications within the
IS literature. Specifically, the theoretical framework employed here considers the nature of
institutional pressures as opposed to the more prevalent practice in the IS literature of focusing
on the magnitude of pressures. While understanding the impact of the magnitude of mimetic,
normative, or coercive isomorphic processes is important, this approach does not explicitly take
into account organizations’ strategic or task environment considerations. Oliver’s (1991)
framework on the other hand, accommodates such concerns more explicitly. Further, we
modeled the organizational response on a continuum of responsiveness as opposed to strictly
viewing compliance or defiance as is common in IS research (e.g. outsource/ not outsource,
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adopt / not adopt). However, as mentioned in the limitations section, the current study does not
go far enough in this regard. Specifically, we were unable to consider the different types of
strategic responses (i.e. acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation) and
the tactics within them. Mignerat and Rivard (2009) have lamented that a lack of consideration
of such a range of possible organizational responses remains an issue in the institutional theory
based IS literature (Mignerat and Rivard, 2009).
Finally, both the type of organizational considerations modeled and the type of institutional
pressures studied in this research may improve the broader institutional theory based
understanding of organizational responses. Such a theoretical contribution is possible as this
study’s context allowed us to consider institutional pressures against (anti-offshoring pressures)
what may be viewed as strategic actions (offshoring) of organizations. This approach goes
beyond the traditional studies on institutional pressures for compliance and the technical or task
environment organizational considerations in terms of costs and benefits of compliance (e.g.,
Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995). Specifically, this study contributes in highlighting
how the past outcomes of the very strategic actions (prior offshoring success) that are the subject
of counter institutional pressures may shape organizational responses.

9

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

This study has some implications for both client (buyers) and service-provider organizations
in relation to offshoring. At the outset, the overall extent of organizational responsiveness to antioffshoring institutional influences was quite low. Nevertheless, there are some key aspects which
come to bear. Consider this background first. This study found that when viewed in absence of
other institutional factors greater imposed restrictions on offshoring faced by organizations led to
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greater responsiveness. However, when viewed in conjunction with the nature of anti-offshoring
pressures, the otherwise statistically significant effect of imposed restrictions became not
significant. Similarly, organizational dependence on federal and state governments had no direct
bearing on how responsive organizations were. Given this background, it seems that directly
imposed restrictions on offshoring (coercive influences if you will) and organizational
dependencies did not lead to greater responsiveness. This suggests that, either such
restrictions/dependencies are not yet strong enough or that organizations are able to strategically
manage them so as not to significantly alter their offshoring course.
However, and instead, one of the strongest factors influencing organizational responsiveness
was related to organizational expectations that reducing or eliminating overall extent of
offshoring would result in enhancement of organizational image as more socially responsible.
This finding suggests that social responsibility implications are far more potent than any direct
pressures or organizational dependencies that would lead them with no choice but to comply.
Thus, client organizations may seek to match their social responsibility approach, whatever it
may be, with the very business decision of offshoring. In other words, not only does an
organization’s social responsibility approach apply during offshore engagements but it also may
apply during the decision making related to offshore engagements. Of course, such
considerations may not apply to all organizations and would need to be carefully applied
depending on a firm’s professed social responsibility approach (Basu and Palazzo, 2008).
In terms of service-provider organizations, this study indicates that along with social
responsibility implications on offshoring decisions, mimetic influences from peer firms may be a
potent factor in determining organizational responsiveness to anti-offshoring institutional
pressures. Further, client organizations’ prior success with offshoring did not directly lower their
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responsiveness but, more subtly, reduced the otherwise strong effect of social legitimacy on
responsiveness. These findings suggest that the value proposition of service providers may also
need to include aspects that address the social responsibility implications of offshoring decisions
and such a value proposition may need to go beyond the process of offshoring itself. Further,
service provider organizations may need to actively manage client perceptions regarding the
future of offshoring given the rather potent effect of mimetic influences in shaping
organizational responses.

10 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has several limitations that must be considered in interpreting its findings. First,
in terms of study respondents, we could not draw a random sample from a known sampling
frame. However, this set of respondents was ideal for the study purposes and access to such
respondents would have otherwise proved very difficult in a random sample approach.
Moreover, the firms in this study are likely to represent the broader population of firms actively
engaged in offshoring. This is because subscribers in the email list we drew upon were actively
involved with and interested in the topic of offshored services and in turn represent a diverse
range of firms. The demographics listed in Table 1 lend support to such broad representation.
The industry representation is also quite broad. More than 58% percent of respondents identified
themselves and/or their firms. An examination of these firm names provides an additional degree
of support that a majority of these firms were in fact large global organizations more likely to
have considerable offshore engagements. Nevertheless, these results may have limited
generalizability. Future replications and enhancements could draw on a random-sample of
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publicly traded firms such that archival data on a variety of firm characteristics may be easily
obtained and assessments of response biases carried out more potently.
Second, the study takes a cross-sectional view on both the independent and dependent
variables. The very nature of institutional pressures and their impact on strategic organizational
responses may be best captured in a longitudinal design. This is because both the nature of the
pressures and the organizational responses can be thought to change over time. Given a lack of
archival data sources regarding the independent and dependent variables and in the interest of
keeping this project feasible we resorted to a cross-sectional design. Although difficult, future
research may capitalize on unique data sources such as the ORN Survey to incorporate a
longitudinal design. Such a design may allow accounting for fluctuations (e.g., increased focus in
election years) within the debate over offshoring itself.
Third, we focused only on anti-offshoring institutional pressures and did not take into
account that organization’s maybe facing “pro-offshoring” pressures from constituents such as
consulting firms and powerful organizational actors such as the board of directors. In other
words, there is a possibility of conflicting pressures on organizations with respect to offshoring,
beyond their technical or operational concerns (i.e., we did control for internal organizational
pressures for cost reduction). To the extent this is the case, organizational responses may be
different as compared to when there is less fragmentation in the organizational field and
consensus among institutional constituents on what is to be expected of organizations (Pache and
Santos, 2010). This is an exciting area for future research. Divergence in expectations along with
internal (organizational) representation of issues could be studied simultaneously with respect to
organizational responses (Pache and Santos, 2010).
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Fourth, most of the study variables were measured by a self-report questionnaire. Again,
given the complete lack of archival data sources, this seems reasonable. Further, prior research
has argued and shown that macro-organizational aspects, such as the focus of this study, are
relatively less susceptible to mono-method biases compared to more micro-organizational
concepts such as job satisfaction, stress, and turnover intentions (Ang and Cummings, 1997;
Crampton and Wagner, 1994). However, future research may draw on other data sources to at
least measure aspects such as environmental uncertainty using objective measures (Dess and
Beard, 1984).
Fifth, this study focused on the degree of responsiveness as the dependent variable. Given
this focus, we did not predict specific response strategies (or tactics within strategies) as is
possible using Oliver’s (1991) framework. Sample size restrictions and low availability of
resources precluded such investigation at this point. Future research may incorporate a mixed
methods design to first fully elucidate the variety of tactics organizations are employing across
different strategies using a qualitative approach. Following this, researchers may conduct a large
scale survey or draw on archival sources to predict specific strategies such as defiance and
acquiescence. For example, while organizations may not directly acquiesce to institutional
pressures, how likely is it that they will adopt some buffering strategies such as choosing
offshore suppliers which can move offshore work back to an organization’s home-country if the
need arises?

11 CONCLUSION
This study assessed the extent to which organizations are responsive to anti-offshoring
institutional pressures by reducing and/or postponing their IT and BP offshoring. Further, it
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attempted to explain the extent of organizational responsiveness based on both the characteristics
of anti-offshoring institutional pressures as well as organizations’ prior success with offshoring
while controlling for important organizational and external factors. In a descriptive sense, the
results do not indicate an impending drift away from offshoring. However, an interesting set of
findings emerged from this study.
Neither internal pressures to reduce costs nor externally imposed restrictions on offshoring
had any significant impact on the extent of organizational responsiveness. Dependence on
government also had no effect. More surprisingly, prior success with offshoring did not directly
lower responsiveness. Instead, a majority of variance in organizational responsiveness was
explained by expectations of enhanced organizational image as socially responsible and mimetic
influences from other organizations–both resulting in greater responsiveness. Further, conflict of
institutional expectations with organizational goals reduced responsiveness. Greater regulatory
environment uncertainty also resulted in lower responsiveness. While organizational strategic
considerations in terms of success with offshoring mattered, their effect was not a blatant
rejection of institutional expectations but a more subtle attenuation of the strength of
institutionally sanctioned social legitimacy obtained from compliance. Expectations of enhanced
organizational image as socially responsible did not lead to as greater responsiveness when
success with offshoring was high. On the other hand, prior success with offshoring exacerbated
the negative effect of regulatory environment uncertainty. Greater regulatory environment
uncertainty led to even lower responsiveness when success with offshoring was high.
As debate over the “true” macro-economic and societal impacts (positive or otherwise) of
offshoring continues (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006), studying this issue further seems important for
at least two reasons. On the one hand, to the extent one believes in the strategic inevitability of
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offshoring regardless of the anti-offshoring sentiment (Venkatraman, 2004) then understanding
how potent is the impact of the institutional context in hindering or promoting offshoring
becomes necessary. On the other hand, if one espouses that organizations should curb their
offshore initiatives then understanding the efficacy/utility or lack thereof of the various
institutional tactics geared toward obtaining organizational compliance becomes also necessary.
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Appendix 1: Measures
Unless otherwise noted below, all items were measured on 7-point Likert-type anchors where 1
was “Strongly Disagree”, 4 was “Neither Disagree nor Agree” and 7 was “Strongly Agree.”
CONTROL VARIABLES:
US Firm or Not
This variable was dummy-coded as “1” if a respondent indicated that his/her organization’s
headquarters country was United States (US). All other countries were coded as “0”
Captive Operations or Not
Organizations having at least some captive operations in overseas locations were coded as “1”
and those reporting no captive operations as part of their offshoring efforts, were coded as “0”.
Senior Most Respondents or Not
This variable was dummy-coded as follows. Respondents were requested to choose their job title
category. The categories included:
C-Level Executive (CEO, CFO, COO, CAO, CIO, CTO, CSO, CKO, etc.)
Director, Executive VP, Senior VP, Vice President, Controller
Department or Business Unit Manager
IT or IS manager
other (please specify)
First, those marking “other” were appropriately categorized based on respondent specifications.
Then all those respondents who chose either category 1 (C-level executive) or category 2
(Director, VP etc.) were coded as “1” senior respondents, and all others were coded as “0”.
Internal Cost Reduction Pressures
Direct Question: Overall, there are pressures from within our organization to reduce costs for
Information Technology (IT) and/or Business Process (BP) related services

Imposed Restrictions on Offshoring
RSTRCT1: Our organization faces Federal and/or State Government level regulatory restrictions
on offshoring (dropped during factor analyses)
RSTRCT2: Our organization faces customer imposed restrictions on offshoring
RSTRCT3: Our organization faces other legal or contractual obligations that impose restrictions
on offshoring
RSTRCT4: Our organization faces employee/union imposed restrictions on offshoring (dropped
during factor analyses)
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RSTRCT5: Overall, our organization faces imposed restrictions on Information Technology
Offshoring
RSTRCT6: Overall, our organization faces imposed restrictions on Business Process Offshoring
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
Organizational Responsiveness
RESP1: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization has reduced or plans to reduce
the overall extent of offshore delivery
RESP2: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization is scaling back or putting on
hold originally planned growth in offshore delivery of Information Technology related services
RESP3: In response to anti-offshoring pressures, our organization is scaling back or putting on
hold originally planned growth in offshore delivery of Business Process related services
RESP4: Our organization has decided to avoid signing longer-term offshore delivery contracts,
at least within the next 12 Months

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
Expectations of Increase in Social Legitimacy
Direct Question: We expect that our image as a socially responsible organization will be
enhanced if we lower our overall extent of offshoring
Dependence on Government
Direct Question: A fairly significant portion of our organization’s total sales (revenues) comes
from Federal and/or State Government(s) as customers
Organizational Plans for Offshoring
This variable was dummy-coded as follows. Toward the beginning of the survey, respondents
were asked to indicate how their overall offshoring portfolio, in terms of Full-time Equivalent
(FTE) workers, was going to change in the next three years. Response categories ranged from
“Decrease by more than 2500 FTE” to “No Change” to “Increase by more than 2500 FTE”.
Those who indicated plans to increase the offshore head-count were coded as “1” and those who
indicated “no change” or a decrease in offshore head-count were coded as “0”.
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Complying Actions of other Firms
Direct Question: I know of executives at other firms who have responded to anti-offshoring
pressures by reducing or planning to reduce the overall extent of offshore delivery
Regulatory Environment Uncertainty:
[7 point anchors ranging from 1: Highly Predictable to 7: Highly Unpredictable]
UNCT1: Changes in tax laws or policies with respect to offshoring are:
UNCT2: Changes in Data Privacy/Security laws or policies that may impact offshoring are:
UNCT3: Changes in Intellectual Property Protection laws or policies that may impact offshoring
are (dropped during factor analyses)
UNCT4: Changes in laws or policies that restrict offshore fulfillment of Government contracts
are
UNCT5: Changes in laws or policies pertaining to hiring of foreign workers (e.g. H1-b visa
policies in the U.S.) are:
Success with Offshoring
OS1: Overall, offshoring has helped us reduce costs
OS2: Overall, offshoring has helped us gain increased access to skilled personnel
OS3: Overall, offshoring has improved our overall flexibility
OS4: Overall, offshoring has helped us achieve increased speed to market or speed of delivery
OS5: We are satisfied with our overall benefits from Information Technology (IT) offshoring
OS6: We are satisfied with our overall benefits from Business Process (BP) offshoring
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Appendix 2: Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing

Netsourcing

Outsourcing

Offshoring

Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing
Challenges
and risks

Descriptive phrases in the literature

Select References on
challenges and risks

Note: A “1” under the columns of “Offshoring” “Outsourcing” and “Netsourcing” indicates the challenge or risk is
pertinent to that sourcing initiative according to the literature
1

1

1

Client's lack of
IT maturity,
experience with
outsourcing,
and inability to
manage
suppliers

1

1

1

Suppliers' lack
of IT
capabilities

1

1

1

1

1

1

Incomplete and
rigid contracts
despite
endemic
uncertainty
with respect to
IT
Hidden costs

1

1

1

Technological
indivisibility/
Relatedness

If an IT activity is poorly performing in-house and
has been badly managed in the first place, will the IT
managers be any better at managing an external
provider? To reduce initial risks in outsourcing, a
company must be capable of managing the IT service
first... (Earl, 1996) Possibility of Weak
Management... Lack of experience could lead to
poorly defined scope and requirements... Lack of
experience could give unfair advantage to suppliers...
lack of offshore project management know-how by
client... differences in development
methodology/processes... client’s inability to manage
the supplier
Suppliers may not always maintain the latest in
technology skills... Lack of domain knowledge…
lack of experience with outsourcing… biased
portrayal by suppliers… supplier's oversold
capabilities... Poor development processes…
different standards... Outdated Technology Skills...
etc.

IT operations and development are inherently
uncertain. IT contracts should be flexible and allow
for conflict resolution in face of inevitable
uncertainties. To the extent this is not possible a
company is better off keeping IT in-house.

Often clients underestimate setup costs,
redeployment costs, relocation costs and longer than
expected handoff or parallel running costs. Clients
also underestimate management costs…. failure to
consider all costs… increased need of coordination
between business users of a client, IT staff of a client,
and supplier's IT specialists could turn into a messy
eternal triangle... all of these can erode the desired
cost savings
To the extent what is being outsourced is not easily
broken down and highly interconnected, companies
will face problems in terms of responsibilities…
increased coordination efforts required… increased
strategic dependencies

Earl (1996)
Jurison (1995)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Hazel (2006)

Earl (1996)
Jurison (1995)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Sakthivel (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Taylor (2006)
Earl (1996)
Bahli and Rivard (2003)
Kern et al. (2002)
Sakthivel (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Taylor (2006)
Earl (1996)
Jurison (1995)
Bahli and Rivard (2003)
Sakthivel (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Taylor (2006)

Earl (1996)
Bahli and Rivard (2003)
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Offshoring

Outsourcing

Netsourcing

Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing

1

1

1

Loss of control
over data,
security, and
intellectual
property
concerns

data security… intellectual property rights… national
security concerns… regulatory concerns in financial
services and other industries… court rules requiring
availability and proof of integrity of electronically
stored information… threats to security of
information resources...

1

1

1

Supplier lockin

Supplier favorable power asymmetries… high
switching costs may shield the vendor… few viable
alternatives… highly specific assets…

1

1

1

Loss of core
competencies

1

1

1

Suppliers'
Financial
Viability

Fuzzy focus... loss of core... Contracting out key
process areas… missing out on any strategic benefits
of IT… treating IT as an undifferentiated commodity
and being unable to exploit IT for competitive
advantage… Loss of autonomy and control over IT
decisions... a client loses the core group of people
who were familiar with the activity and have
expertise to execute the activity in-house...
Supplier's financial instability… supplier may cease
operations… supplier going out of business… is the
offshore supplier financially stable…

1

1

1

Unrealistic
customer
expectations

Client has inflated expectations of benefits from
outsourcing/offshoring… failure to manage end-user
expectations in offshore development projects…

1

1

Inability to
obtain/retain
human
capital/Vendor
staffing issues

Although hoped for, the supplier may not have the
best talent assigned to a customer account, while the
client runs the risk of losing some of the better talent
in house… lower productivity and skewed skills of
supplier employees…

1

1

Business
Uncertainty

Business uncertainty in terms of long term direction
and needs increases opportunity costs.

1

1

Loss of
opportunities
for
Organizational
Learning

The strategic scope of systems often emerges as users
learn what is possible and as the business context and
needs change. By outsourcing a client may miss or be
late in organizational learning opportunities

Challenges
and risks

Descriptive phrases in the literature

Select References on
challenges and risks
Jurison (1995)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Kliem (2004)
Sakthivel (2007)
Goodman (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Jurison (1995)
Bahli and Rivard (2003)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Earl (1996)
Jurison (1995)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Aron et al. (2005)

Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Kern et al. (2002)
Goodman and Ramer
(2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Kern et al. (2002)
Sakthivel (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Taylor (2006)
Earl (1996)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Sakthivel (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Taylor (2006)
Earl (1996)
Earl (1996)
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Outsourcing

1

1

Loss of
Innovative
Capacity

1

1

Opportunistic
behavior by
supplier

1

1

IT professionals and employees with clients, in
general consider outsourcing and particularly
offshoring as a threat to their survival and growth

1

1

Internal
Employee
Backlash / Low
Morale
Communication
problems

1

1

Organizational
cultural
distance
Socio-Political
Risks

Inability of supplier employees to assimilate in
project teams… different work styles…

1

National
culture distance

Inability to resolve differences in values… culture
shock… cultural and ethical differences

1

Negative
impact on
image of client

political backlash against clients engaging in offshore
outsourcing… back lash from labor unions …
perceived as unpatriotic…

1

Netsourcing

Offshoring

Summary of Key Challenges and Risks in IT Sourcing
Challenges
and risks

Descriptive phrases in the literature

Innovation needs slack resources, organic and fluid
organizational processes, and experimental and
intrapreneurial competences -- all attributes that
external sourcing does not guarantee. If a company
has outsourced and downsized as well, its ability to
innovate may be impaired.
Opportunistic behavior by supplier… breach of
contract by the vendor… opportunism…

Extended time zones… geographic distance…
Language Barriers… geographic separation between
client and vendor and limitations in communications
and transmission systems…

Trade barriers… border tensions… political
instability in offshore destinations… animosity
between cultures… exchange rate risk… sovereign
risk…

Select References on
challenges and risks
Earl (1996)
Hoecht and Trott (2006)

Jurison (1995)
Sullivan and
Ngwenyama (2005)
Goodman and Ramer
(2007)
Aron et al. (2005)
Kliem (2004)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Shao and David (2007)
Kliem (2004)
Sakthivel (2007)
Goodman (2007)
Aron et al. (2005)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Kliem (2004); Lacity
and Rottman (2008)
Kliem (2004)
Sakthivel (2007)
Goodman and Ramer
(2007)
Aron et al. (2005)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Kliem (2004)
Goodman (2007)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Iacovou and Nakatsu
(2008)
Shao and David (2007)

Smith and McKeen
(2004)

